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 REASONABLE BURDENS: RESOLVING THE 
CONFLICT BETWEEN DISABLED EMPLOYEES AND 
THEIR COWORKERS 
NICOLE B. PORTER* 
ABSTRACT 
 This Article addresses one of the most difficult issues under the 
reasonable accommodation provision of the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act (ADA): how to resolve the conflict that arises when accommo-
dating a disabled employee negatively affects or interferes with the 
rights of other employees. Several scholars and the Supreme Court (in 
U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett)1 have weighed in on this debate, but 
their analyses fall short of the ultimate goal of this Article—to achieve 
equal opportunity for individuals with disabilities without unneces-
sarily interfering with the rights of other employees. In order to 
achieve that goal, this Article proposes a statutory amendment to the 
reasonable accommodation provision of the ADA. This amendment 
would make reasonable most accommodations that affect other em-
ployees, unless the accommodation results in the termination of an-
other employee. In this way, more productive disabled employees will 
remain employed, while only placing a reasonable burden on the rest 
of the workforce. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Employees often have a negative, even visceral reaction to being 
treated differently from someone else in the workplace. Thus, it is 
not surprising that a decision to give a disabled employee a special 
benefit or a waiver from a generally applicable rule or policy will of-
ten be met with significant hostility by other employees. Accordingly, 
employers are reluctant to provide these benefits or waivers (collec-
tively called accommodations) even when they may be required to al-
low a disabled employee to remain a productive member of the work-
force. The negative reaction is magnified when these accommoda-
tions not only benefit the disabled employee but also arguably harm 
the nondisabled coworkers. This conflict between disabled employees 
and their nondisabled coworkers is the subject of this Article.  
 The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 19902 was enacted 
to help individuals with disabilities achieve equal opportunity in the 
workplace and society.3 Under Title I of the ADA, an employer is re-
quired to provide a qualified disabled employee with a reasonable ac-
commodation that will allow the disabled employee to perform the 
essential functions of the job.4 There are several examples of accom-
modations listed in the statute. They include making the workplace 
accessible, modifying the work environment or the job structure, pro-
viding alternative work schedules, and reassigning a disabled em-
ployee to a vacant position5 if it is not feasible to accommodate a dis-
abled employee in his existing position. Many of these accommoda-
tions negatively affect other employees; often, the most significant ef-
fect occurs when a disabled employee gets reassigned to another 
position when other, nondisabled employees are interested in the 
same position. Yet, without the accommodation, the disabled em-
                                                                                                                     
 2.  Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 705, 45 U.S.C. §§ 
12101-213, & 47 U.S.C. §§ 152, 221, 225, 611 (2000).  
 3. See id. § 12101. 
 4. Id. § 12112(a), -(b)(5)(A). 
 5. Id. § 12111(9). 
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ployee would be out of a job, suffering the devastating conse-
quences of unemployment. 
 This Article proposes that the resolution to this conflict lies in an 
amendment to the ADA that clearly defines an employer’s obligation 
to accommodate a disabled employee even though the accommodation 
conflicts with the rights of other employees. The amendment would 
add the following statement to the reasonable accommodation provi-
sion6: “An accommodation of last resort7 should not be deemed unrea-
sonable because of its effect on other employees or its violation of a 
seniority system or other neutral policy of an employer, UNLESS  its 
provision would result in the involuntary termination of another em-
ployee.”  
 Part II of this Article will provide the reader with a background of 
the ADA and will frame the history of the debate over the proper in-
terpretation of the reasonable accommodation provision. This debate 
culminated in the Supreme Court’s only decision thus far to address 
the scope of the reasonable accommodation provision. The case, U.S. 
Airways, Inc. v. Barnett,8 also will be discussed in Part II. Part III 
will demonstrate that both the legislative history and the statutory 
language of the ADA support my conclusion that the Court erred in 
adopting its rule in Barnett. Part IV will outline the proposed statu-
tory amendment as well as discuss the rationale for drafting the 
amendment as it is drafted.  
 Part V will outline the normative justifications for this proposal, 
including that (1) the amendment helps to achieve equal opportunity 
for disabled individuals, (2) the amendment provides guidance to 
employers and courts when forced to resolve the conflict between dis-
abled employees and their coworkers, and (3) this proposal can be 
justified by drawing on well-accepted Title VII jurisprudence. Fi-
nally, Part VI will address the anticipated criticisms of this proposal. 
I will respond to two main criticisms: (1) the argument that this pro-
posal will increase the backlash against the ADA and (2) the criti-
cism that the proposal is unfair because it requires employees to bear 
some of the burden of accommodation instead of forcing the employer 
to bear the entire cost of accommodation. This Article will demon-
strate that this proposed amendment is not only necessary to re-
solve the conflict between disabled employees and their coworkers, 
but that the burden placed on other employees in the workplace is 
a reasonable one.  
                                                                                                                     
 6. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A). 
 7. “Accommodation of last resort” simply means that the employer and employee 
have explored and dismissed the possibility of other accommodations; accordingly, the ac-
commodation at issue is the last possible accommodation. If it is not granted, termination 
will most likely result. 
 8. 535 U.S. 391 (2002). 
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II.   THE CONFLICT: REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS THAT AFFECT 
OTHER EMPLOYEES 
A.   The ADA’s Provisions 
 Unlike other antidiscrimination statutes (such as Title VII)9 that 
protect individuals regardless of their sex, race, or national origin, 
the ADA defines very narrowly the class of persons who can sue un-
der the statute. In order to state a prima facie claim of discrimina-
tion, a plaintiff must prove that she has a disability, which is defined 
as follows: “(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially 
limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a 
record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such 
an impairment.”10 This provision is significant not only because it 
narrows the number of individuals who can claim they have a dis-
ability but also because it precludes a “reverse discrimination” law-
suit. A nondisabled person cannot sue under the ADA, claiming that 
he was treated worse than the employee with a disability.11 
 The other unique provision of the ADA is its reasonable accommo-
dation provision. Courts and scholars have long recognized that for 
individuals with disabilities to be afforded the same opportunities as 
nondisabled individuals, occasionally the disabled individuals must 
be treated differently.12 A simple illustration will suffice. Assume a 
person uses a wheelchair and seeks a job in an office building. Other 
nondisabled applicants also seek the same job with the same em-
ployer. The applicant with the disability might have the same cre-
dentials as the nondisabled applicants, but unless the building is ac-
cessible for his wheelchair, he will not even get his foot in the door, 
literally or figuratively. Accordingly, the ADA drafters sensibly de-
cided that the disabled community could only have an equal oppor-
tunity to compete for, and work in, the same jobs as nondisabled em-
ployees if there was a mechanism to put disabled individuals on an 
equal playing field with nondisabled individuals.13 That mechanism 
is the reasonable accommodation provision.  
 The ADA states that it is unlawful for employers to discriminate 
against individuals with disabilities14 and that the term discriminate 
includes 
                                                                                                                     
 9. Civil Rights Act of 1964 tit. 7, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000). 
 10. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000). 
 11. RUTH COLKER, THE DISABILITY PENDULUM: THE FIRST DECADE OF AMERICANS 
WITH DISABILITIES ACT  97–99 (2005). 
 12. See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger, Introduction to BACKLASH AGAINST THE ADA 1, 
3 (Linda Hamilton Krieger ed., 2006); Carlos A. Ball, Preferential Treatment and Reason-
able Accommodation Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 55 ALA. L. REV. 951, 955 
(2004). 
 13. See Ball, supra note 12, at 955. 
 14. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000). 
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not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or 
mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a dis-
ability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity 
can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue 
hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity . . . .15 
 Not only did Congress prohibit the failure to accommodate, but it 
also defined the term “reasonable accommodation” to include  
 (A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessi-
ble to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and  
 (B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, re-
assignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of 
equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modification of 
examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of quali-
fied readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for 
individuals with disabilities.16 
The only statutory limitation to an employer’s duty to accommodate 
is that the accommodation cannot pose an undue hardship on the 
employer.17 The statute defines undue hardship as “an action requir-
ing significant difficulty or expense, when considered in light of the 
factors set forth in subparagraph (B).”18  
 The legislative history provides some guidance on the scope of the 
reasonable accommodation provision. The history states that the rea-
sonable accommodation provision is “central to the non-
discrimination mandate of the ADA.”19 Also indicated in the legisla-
tive history is that an employer can choose between various effective 
accommodations and does not have to automatically provide the pre-
ferred accommodation requested by the employee.20 This limitation 
gives meaning to the concept of “accommodation of last resort.” Be-
cause an employer does not have to provide an employee his pre-
ferred accommodation, the employer is always free to choose the 
least onerous accommodation as long as it is an effective accommoda-
tion.21 For instance, the employer is free to choose other accommoda-
tions that allow the employee to work in his current job before it con-
siders reassignment.22 The employer is only required to consider the 
                                                                                                                     
 15. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A). 
 16. Id. § 12111(9). 
 17. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A). 
 18. Id. § 12111(10). These factors will be discussed infra Part III. 
 19. H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 462 (1990). 
 20. Id.; Chai R. Feldblum, Americans with Disabilities Act: Selected Employment Re-
quirements, Q217 ALI-ABA VIDEO C. REV 29, 65 (1992).  
 21. Hankins v. The Gap, Inc., 84 F.3d 797, 800-01 (6th Cir. 1996); Feldblum, supra 
note 20, at 65. 
 22. Hankins, 84 F.3d at 800-01; Feldblum, supra note 20, at 65. 
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reassignment accommodation when an employer is unable or unwill-
ing to accommodate the employee in his current job.23  
 In addition to the legislative history, the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission’s (EEOC) guidelines are instructive regarding 
the scope of the reasonable accommodation provision under the ADA, 
specifically the reassignment accommodation.24 First, reassigning an 
individual with a disability is only required for current employees, 
not applicants.25 Second, employers should only consider reassign-
ment if there are no other accommodations available that would al-
low the employee to perform her current job.26 Third, a disabled em-
ployee only has a right to a truly vacant position.27 Accordingly, an 
employer is not required to bump another employee out of a job nor is 
an employer required to create a job for the employee with the dis-
ability.28 Fourth, an employer is not required to transfer a disabled 
employee if he is not qualified for the vacant position.29 But according 
to the EEOC, an employer is required to transfer an employee to a 
vacant position as long as that employee is qualified.30 In other 
words, only allowing the employee to compete for the vacant position 
is not an accommodation according to the EEOC.31  
B.   The Conflict 
 The conflict discussed in this Article arises because almost all ac-
commodations given to disabled employees affect other nondisabled 
                                                                                                                     
 23. See Feldblum, supra note 20, at 63. 
 24. Stephen F. Befort, Reasonable Accommodation and Reassignment Under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act: Answers, Questions, and Suggested Solutions After U.S. 
Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 931, 941-43 (2003). These include (1) formal 
regulations, 29 C.F.R. §1630.1-.16 (2006); (2) the Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1630 app. §1630.2(o) (2006); (3) U.S. EQUAL 
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, A TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL ON THE 
EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS (TITLE I) OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (1992); AND 
(4) U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: 
REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION AND UNDUE HARDSHIP UNDER THE AMERICAN WITH 
DISABILITIES ACT (2002), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/accommodation.html 
[hereinafter ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE]. 
 25. 29 C.F.R. § 1630 app. at § 1630.2(o) (2006). It would seem this would not even 
need to be stated, since logically, an employer cannot reassign someone who is not yet 
working. It would also seem that if a disabled applicant realized that a particular position 
required job duties that he was unable to perform that he could simply apply for a job he 
could perform. 
 26. Id.; Thomas H. Christopher & Charles M. Rice, The Americans with Disabilities 
Act: An Overview of the Employment Provisions, 33 S. TEX. L. REV. 759, 779 (1992); 
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 24, ¶ 6908 at 5453. 
 27.  29 C.F.R. § 1630 app. at §1630.2(a). 
 28. ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 24, ¶ 6908 at 5453. 
 29. Id.  
 30. This would, of course, be subject to the undue hardship limitation. 42 U.S.C. 
§12112(b)(5)(A) (2000). 
 31. See Befort, supra note 24, at 943 (citing ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 24). 
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employees. For instance, if an employer accommodates an employee’s 
disability by not requiring the employee to lift anything over thirty 
pounds, other employees might be required to do more than their fair 
share of lifting to get the job done. An employer’s accommodation of a 
disability precluding night shift work or requiring a set schedule or 
part-time schedule might require nondisabled employees to work less 
desirable shifts more often. Even offering a disabled employee a leave 
of absence in order to allow him to heal from a major surgery might 
mean other employees have to work harder or longer to make up the 
difference. Finally, giving a disabled employee a transfer to a vacant 
position might mean that a nondisabled employee has to forego the 
opportunity to transfer into the same position. This last conflict is 
the one most often discussed by courts and scholars. 
 Prior to the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Barnett, lower courts 
primarily discussed the conflict between employees with disabilities 
and those without in the context of a reassignment accommodation 
that violated the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement. The 
majority of cases decided pre-Barnett adhered to a per se rule that 
the ADA does not require employers to violate an applicable seniority 
provision in a collective bargaining agreement to comply with the 
ADA’s accommodation provision.32  
 However, a few courts rejected the per se rule regarding collective 
bargaining agreements and accommodations. For instance, in 1997, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia re-
jected the per se rule and adopted a balancing approach to resolve 
the employee’s reasonable accommodation claim under the ADA, 
though the judgment was later vacated.33 The Ninth Circuit in Bar-
nett v. U.S. Air, Inc.34 did an about face from its earlier per se rule 
holdings when it held that the presence of a seniority system was 
                                                                                                                     
 32. Willis v. Pac. Mar. Ass’n, 236 F.3d 1160, 1165 (9th Cir. 2001); Lujan v. Pac. Mar. 
Ass’n, 165 F.3d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1999); Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 117 F.3d 800, 
810 (5th Cir. 1997); Kralik v. Durbin, 130 F.3d 76, 83 (3d Cir. 1997); Eckles v. Consol. Rail 
Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1051 (7th Cir. 1996); Cochrum v. Old Ben Coal Co., 102 F.3d 908, 912-
13 (7th Cir. 1996); Benson v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1114 (8th Cir. 1995). 
 33. Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 116 F.3d 876, 894-95 (D.C. Cir. 1997), reh’g en banc 
granted and judgment vacated, 124 F.3d 1302 (D.C. Cir. 1997). The first appellate decision 
in this case held that the district court erred in resting its dismissal of Aka’s “ ‘reasonable 
accommodation’ claim on the conclusion that any conflict between a requested accommoda-
tion and a collective bargaining agreement bars the disabled employee from claiming an 
entitlement to the accommodation under the ADA.” Id. at 894. The court in this case found  
the fact that a requested accommodation does not fall squarely within the 
terms of the applicable collective bargaining agreement is relevant only insofar 
as it undermines the employee’s claim that the requested accommodation is 
“reasonable,” or bolsters the employer’s affirmative defense that the accommo-
dation could not be provided without “undue hardship.” 
Id.  
 34.  228 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2000). 
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merely “a factor in the undue hardship analysis.”35 Of course, Barnett 
was different from these other cases in that its seniority system was 
unilaterally imposed by the employer rather than the product of a 
collective bargaining agreement.36 The court held that a “case-by-case 
fact intensive analysis is required to determine whether any particular 
reassignment would constitute an undue hardship to the employer.”37  
 Scholars have also disagreed about the proper scope of the reas-
signment accommodation. As was true in the courts, much of the de-
bate centered on how to handle the situation where a disabled em-
ployee needed to transfer to a vacant position as the last resort but 
other employees had either superior seniority or qualifications.38 
When the conflict involved a more qualified nondisabled employee, 
some scholars argued that the duty to accommodate should require 
an employer to give the vacant position to the individual with the 
disability as a reasonable accommodation.39 They argued that the 
ADA’s central goal of enabling individuals with disabilities to remain 
in the “ ‘economic and social mainstream of American life’ ” will not 
be accomplished without the transfer because the disabled employee 
would no longer have a job.40 Other scholars, however, have argued 
that requiring an employer to put the disabled employee in the vacant 
position when there are better-qualified candidates goes far beyond the 
intent of the ADA by creating preferences for disabled employees.41  
 Scholarly debate has also surrounded the treatment of collectively 
bargained seniority systems. Some scholars argued that the ADA 
does not support the per se rule adopted by courts that the reassign-
ment provision should never force an employer to violate seniority 
                                                                                                                     
 35. Id. at 1120. But see Foreman, 117 F.3d at 810 (following the per se rule that the 
ADA does not require employers to violate an applicable seniority provision of a collective 
bargaining agreement); Cochrum, 102 F.3d at 912-13 (same); Eckles, 94 F.3d 1051 (same); 
Benson, 62 F.3d at 1114 (same). 
 36. Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1118. 
 37. Id. at 1120. 
 38. See Stephen F. Befort & Tracey Homes Donesky, Reassignment Under the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act: Reasonable Accommodation, Affirmative Action, or Both?, 57 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1045, 1064-73 (2000); Jeffrey S. Berenholz, Note, The Development of 
Reassignment to a Vacant Position in the Americans with Disabilities Act, 15 HOFSTRA 
LAB. & EMP. L.J. 635, 653 (1998); Estella J. Schoen, Note, Does the ADA Make Exceptions 
in a Unionized Workplace? The Conflict Between the Reassignment Provision of the ADA 
and Collectively Bargained Seniority Systems, 82 MINN. L.R. 1391, 1392-93, 1401-24 
(1998). 
 39. Befort & Donesky, supra note 38, at 1088 (quoting S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 20 
(1989)).  
 40. Id. at 1088-89. 
 41. Thomas F. O’Neil III & Kenneth M. Reiss, Reassigning Disabled Employees Under 
the ADA: Preferences Under the Guise of Equality?, 17 LAB. LAW. 347, 359-60 (2001); Jenni-
fer Beale, Comment, Affirmative Action and Violation of Union Contracts: The EEOC’s 
New Requirements Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 811, 821 
(2001). 
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rights under a collective bargaining agreement.42 One scholar in par-
ticular believes that the “per se approach substantially weakens the 
ADA” and violates its intent by making “it easier to keep a disabled 
individual out of the workforce” instead of eliminating discrimina-
tion.43 Scholars at the other end of the spectrum have favored the per 
se rule because they believe that a balancing or case-by-case ap-
proach to these conflicts would leave employers too vulnerable to the 
threat of litigation.44 These debates culminated in the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision in Barnett. 
C.   The Barnett Case 
 In U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett,45 plaintiff Robert Barnett was 
employed as a cargo handler when he injured his back on the job. His 
injury precluded him from carrying out some of the functions of his 
job as a cargo handler.46 Accordingly, he used his seniority under 
U.S. Airways’ voluntary and unilaterally imposed seniority system47 
(that is, not a seniority system bargained for under a collective bar-
gaining agreement) to transfer to a position in the mailroom, which 
he could perform even with the limitations caused by his back im-
pairment.48 After Barnett spent two years in that position, the com-
pany made the decision to open the position to seniority bidding, and 
at least two other employees—both with more seniority than Bar-
nett—expressed interest in the mailroom position.49 Barnett asked 
his employer to allow him to remain in the position as a reasonable 
accommodation for his back disability.50 The company considered this 
request, but eventually denied it and allowed one of the employees 
with more seniority to transfer into the position, resulting in Bar-
nett’s termination.51  
                                                                                                                     
 42. See Robert A. Dubault, Note, The ADA and the NLRA: Balancing Individual and 
Collective Rights, 70 IND. L.J. 1271, 1294-97 (1995) (proposing a balancing approach to the 
conflict between the ADA and the NLRA when a disabled employee requests an accommo-
dation); see also Judith Fornalik, Note, Reasonable Accommodations and Collective Bar-
gaining Agreements: A Continuing Dispute, 31 U. TOL. L. REV. 117, 140-41 (1999); Barbara 
Kamenir Frankel, Comment, The Impact of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 on 
Collective Bargaining Agreements, 22 SW. U. L. REV. 257, 282-84 (1992); Schoen, supra 
note 38, at 1412-14, 1420. 
 43. Fornalik, supra note 42, at 140-41.  
 44. Condon A. McGlothen & Gary N. Savine, Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp.: Rec-
onciling the ADA with Collective Bargaining Agreements: Is This the Correct Approach?, 46 
DEPAUL L. REV. 1043, 1044 (1997); O’Neil & Reiss, supra note 41, at 357-58 (quoting Willis 
v. Pac. Mar. Ass’n, 244 F.3d 675, 681 (9th Cir. 2001)).  
 45. 535 U.S. 391 (2002). 
 46. Id. at 394. 
 47. Id. at 404.  
 48. Id. at 394. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id.  
 51. Id. 
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 As noted above, courts and scholars have disagreed about whose 
interests should trump—the rights of the employee with a disability 
under the ADA or the rights of other, nondisabled employees under a 
seniority system.52 The Supreme Court decided this issue in favor of 
the nondisabled employees, holding that, in the majority of cases, a 
request for a reasonable accommodation should not trump the provi-
sions of a seniority system regardless of whether the employer is 
bound to the seniority system by contract (through a collective bar-
gaining agreement negotiated with a union) or has full authority to 
change the seniority system at will (as in Barnett).53 The court did 
state that a plaintiff could present evidence of special circumstances 
making a seniority rule exception reasonable, thus defeating an em-
ployer’s demand for summary judgment.54 
 In addition to its discussion of the ultimate holding in the case, 
the Court also addressed the appropriate burden of proof. The Court 
held that a plaintiff only needs to show that an accommodation 
seems reasonable on its face, and then the employer has the burden 
of showing that the accommodation would cause an undue hard-
ship.55 Yet while one might think that this case would have turned on 
the undue hardship provision, thereby placing the ultimate burden 
on the employer, the Court held otherwise.56 
 The Supreme Court ultimately concluded that a proposed accom-
modation is not reasonable if it violates a seniority system and that 
the ADA does not require case-by-case proof that the seniority sys-
tem should prevail.57 The Court cited several reasons to support this 
conclusion, including “the importance of seniority systems to em-
ployee-management relations,” the fact that seniority systems under 
collective bargaining agreements trump a requested “reasonable ac-
commodation in the context of the linguistically similar Rehabilita-
tion Act,”58 and the fact that several circuit courts have reached simi-
lar conclusions.59 The Court noted that “the relevant seniority system 
                                                                                                                     
 52. Ball, supra note 12, at 956 (discussing the different sides taken by the appellate 
courts). 
 53. See Barnett, 535 U.S. at 406.  
 54. Id.  
 55. Id. at 401-02. 
 56. Id. This is pure speculation, of course, but it seems likely that the Court did not 
want the decision to turn on the undue hardship analysis, because that term is spe-
cifically defined in the statute, whereas the term “reasonable” can be subject to many 
different interpretations.  
 57. See id. at 403. 
 58. The Court’s comparison to the Rehabilitation Act is misplaced because the Reha-
bilitation Act did not contain reassignment as a possible accommodation, while the ADA 
does. Infra notes 110-15 and accompanying text. 
 59. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 403.  
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advantages, and related difficulties that result from violations of sen-
iority rules, are not limited to collectively bargained systems.”60 
 The Court’s final argument in support of its holding was that 
nothing in the ADA suggests that Congress intended to undermine 
seniority systems.61 The Court stated that seniority systems were 
created to ensure consistent, uniform treatment of employees and 
that their success depends on these expectations.62 Because requiring 
an employer to show more than simply the existence of a seniority 
system would undermine the seniority system’s very purpose, the 
Court held that an employer is ordinarily only required to point to 
the seniority system to have summary judgment awarded in its fa-
vor.63 As stated earlier, the Court did note that a plaintiff is free to 
show special circumstances to prove that the requested accommoda-
tion, based on the particular facts, is reasonable despite a seniority 
system.64 The plaintiff has the burden in this regard and must ex-
plain why an exception to the seniority system would constitute a 
reasonable accommodation.65 
 Barnett was not a unanimous opinion. Justices Stevens and 
O’Connor joined Justice Breyer’s majority opinion, but both wrote 
separate concurring opinions. Justices Scalia, Thomas, Souter, and 
Ginsburg dissented.66 While Justice Stevens’ concurring opinion adds 
little, Justice O’Connor argued that the inquiry should turn on 
“whether the seniority system is legally enforceable.”67 However, 
she realized her separate opinion would have led to a failure of the 
Court to arrive at a resolution of the case; thus, she signed on to 
the majority’s opinion.68 
 Justice Scalia’s dissent criticized both the uncertainty resulting 
from the majority’s test and what he believes is a mistaken interpre-
tation of the ADA.69 In his view, the accommodation provision only 
requires “suspension (within reason) of those employment rules and 
practices that the employee’s disability prevents him from observ-
                                                                                                                     
 60. Id. at 404. 
 61. Id. at 405. This is a conclusion with which I completely disagree, as will be 
discussed below. 
 62. Id. at 404. 
 63. Id. at 405-06. 
 64. Id.  
 65. Id. at 406. The Court provided a nonexhaustive list of examples of when an em-
ployee could show that an accommodation would be reasonable despite a seniority system: 
“the employer [has retained] the right to change the seniority system unilaterally, [and] 
exercises that right frequently . . . [or] the system already contains exceptions [and that] 
one further exception is unlikely to matter.” Id. at 405. 
 66. Id. at 393. 
 67. Id. at 408 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 68. Id. at 408. 
 69. Id. at 412 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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ing.”70 Justice Scalia believes that the only accommodations that are 
required are ones that remove a barrier that burdens a disabled per-
son because of his disability. Because, in his view, neutral policies 
and practices burden everyone equally, accommodations in the form 
of preferential treatment are not required.71 
 On the other hand, Justice Souter’s dissent argued that “[n]othing 
in the ADA insulates seniority rules from the ‘reasonable accommo-
dation’ requirement.”72 He argued that the legislative history of the 
ADA makes clear that there was no intention to carve out an excep-
tion for seniority systems.73 Justice Souter also emphasized the fact 
that Barnett was already in the mailroom position and that U.S. 
Airways had full authority to not classify the mailroom position as 
vacant in the first place.74 
 The majority decision in Barnett is troubling because it will lead 
to the termination of more productive employees with disabilities. 
Not only does this have consequences to the disabled employee and 
his family, but it also has negative consequences to the employer, 
who is losing a valuable employee, and to society, which might have 
to bear the cost of supporting the disabled employee if he is unable to 
find another job. Not only is the Barnett decision troubling from a 
normative perspective, but it is also doctrinally wrong, as evidenced 
by the statutory construction and legislative history.  
III.   THE ERROR OF BARNETT 
 Regardless of how Barnett is interpreted, it falls short of Con-
gress’s goal of equal opportunity for individuals with disabilities. 
This Part will argue that both the expansive view and the narrow 
view of Barnett are erroneous. 
A.   An Expansive View of Barnett 
 Some scholars have argued that Barnett is not limited to cases 
where an accommodation violates a seniority system.75 In fact, Pro-
                                                                                                                     
 70. Id.  
 71. Id. at 413. 
 72. Id. at 420 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 73. See id. at 421. 
 74. Id. at 423. 
 75. See, e.g., Cheryl L. Anderson, “Neutral” Employer Policies and the ADA: The Im-
plications of US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett Beyond Seniority Systems, 51 DRAKE L. REV. 1, 
35-36 (2002). Some lawyers, giving advice to clients in the aftermath of Barnett, were un-
certain of its breadth. See, e.g., Stephen M. Olson & April L. Boyer, Supreme Court’s U.S. 
Airways Decision: Employers Are Not Required to Override a Seniority-Based System to Ac-
commodate a Disabled Employee, K&L ALERT: EMPLOYMENT LAW, (Kirkpatrick & Lockhart 
Nicholson Graham LLP), May 2002, http://www.klng.com/files/tbl_s48News/ 
PDFUpload307/7307/ela0502.pdf (stating that the Court in Barnett suggests possible “ex-
tensions of the rule to other disability-neutral workplace policies”); Labor & Employment—
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fessor Cheryl Anderson believes that a broad reading of Barnett 
could lead to the conclusion that the Court has developed a “neutral 
policy presumption,” whereby any accommodation that violates a 
neutral rule is presumptively unreasonable.76 This, I believe, would 
turn the ADA’s reasonable accommodation provision on its head be-
cause most accommodations are a deviation from a neutral policy.77 
Anderson is concerned—and rightfully so—that Barnett will make it 
harder for disabled employees to get accommodations when those ac-
commodations affect other employees.78 Yet, even though Barnett 
could be read broadly to prohibit all accommodations that have a 
negative effect on other employees or otherwise violate a neutral 
rule,79 the statutory language of the ADA flatly contradicts such 
an application. 
 As noted in Part II, several accommodations are mentioned in the 
statutory language of the ADA itself.80 The only limitation to the rea-
sonable accommodation provision mentioned in the statute itself is 
the “undue hardship” defense.81  The statute lists several factors that 
courts should consider in deciding if a proposed accommodation cre-
ates an undue burden:  
 (i) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed under this 
chapter; 
 (ii) the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities in-
volved in the provision of the reasonable accommodation; the 
number of persons employed at such facility; the effect on expenses 
and resources, or the impact otherwise of such accommodation 
upon the operation of the facility; 
 (iii) the overall financial resources of the covered entity; the 
overall size of the business of a covered entity with respect to the 
number of its employees; the number, type, and location of its fa-
cilities; and 
 (iv) the type of operation or operations of the covered entity, in-
cluding the composition, structure, and functions of the workforce 
of such entity; the geographic separateness, administrative, or fis-
                                                                                                                     
ALERT: Bona Fide Seniority System Usually Trumps ADA Accommodation Request, Ad-
ams & Reese, LLP (June 17, 2002), 
http://www.adamsandreese.com/news_and_events/full_article.html?newsID=123 (question-
ing whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Barnett applied to other disability-neutral 
employment policies). 
 76. See Anderson, supra note 75, at 35-36. 
 77. See id. at 17 (stating that “implicit in reasonable accommodation is the notion 
that policies may have to be changed, whether they be neutral policies or not”). 
 78. Id. at 36-37, 41. 
 79. For a decision applying the Barnett rule beyond the reassignment accommodation, 
see Shields v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles, No. C04-928JLR, 2005 WL 
2045887, at 8-9 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 25, 2005) (denying an accommodation for day shift work 
and limited overtime because of seniority system). 
 80. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2000). 
 81. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A). 
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cal relationship of the facility or facilities in question to the cov-
ered entity.82 
 Notably absent from this list is any factor that considers the effect 
such an accommodation has on other employees in the workforce. 
Certainly this omission is not inadvertent. Congress had to know 
when drafting the ADA that some—if not most—accommodations 
would affect other employees and that those employees might feel 
that the accommodation gives an unfair advantage to the employee 
with the disability. 
 Yet despite Congress’s knowledge that many reasonable accom-
modations will burden other employees, Congress did not write an 
exception into the statute to protect nondisabled employees. It could 
have accomplished this in several different ways. First, Congress 
could have allowed a broader class of persons to bring a complaint al-
leging a violation of the ADA. In other words, as it stands now, only 
individuals with a disability (as that term is narrowly defined both in 
the statutory language itself and even more so by the courts) can 
bring a claim under the ADA.83 A nondisabled person cannot bring a 
reverse discrimination suit under the ADA, claiming that someone 
with a disability was treated better than he was.84 If Congress was 
worried about the effects accommodations might have on other em-
ployees, it could have broadened the protected class to include every-
one. For instance, it simply could have added “disability” as a pro-
tected category under Title VII, but it did not. It chose to draft a very 
specific statute with a provision not seen in traditional discrimina-
tion law. Accordingly, it must have presumed that some nondisabled 
                                                                                                                     
 82. Id. § 12111(10)(B). 
 83. Id. § 12111(8) (defining qualified individual with a disability); id. § 12112(a) (stat-
ing that no employer can discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability); 
COLKER, supra note 11, at 18, 97-99. For cases that have limited the definition of disabil-
ity, see Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 196-98 (2002) (requiring plaintiff to 
prove that she was substantially limited in her ability to perform activities of central im-
portance to daily life); Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482-83 (1999) (holding 
that whether a person has a disability should be determined by viewing the person in his 
mitigated state); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 521-22 (1999) (holding 
that plaintiff’s hypertension does not render him disabled because it is controlled through 
medication and his employer did not regard him as disabled simply because he did not 
meet the Department of Transportation’s regulations for drivers); Albertson’s, Inc. v. 
Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 563-65 (1999) (holding that the plaintiff who has monocu-
lar vision may not be disabled because of the possibility that his brain has adjusted to 
his limited eyesight). 
 84. COLKER, supra note 11, at 97-99; Ball, supra note 12, at 981 (arguing that 
“[c]ritics of affirmative action like to refer to [the reasonable accommodation provi-
sion] as . . . reverse discrimination that benefits . . . minorities at the expense of others. . . . 
This criticism is not applicable to reasonable accommodation cases because preferential 
treatment [is] required by law . . . .”); see also SUSAN GLUCK MEZEY, DISABLING 
INTERPRETATIONS: THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT IN FEDERAL COURT 43 (2005) 
(stating that “[u]nlike Title VII, which allows persons of either sex and of all races to show an 
employer acted on the basis of sex or race, the ADA only applies to people with disabilities”). 
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employees would be affected by some accommodations, yet it chose 
not to give them a remedy.  
 Another, less drastic way Congress could have acknowledged the 
effects of accommodations on other employees is by limiting the defi-
nition of reasonable accommodation. For instance, Congress could 
have stated, “An accommodation that has a significant effect on other 
employees is not reasonable.” Similarly, it could have included the ef-
fect on other employees as a factor under the undue hardship provi-
sion. Again, it chose not to. Accordingly, it is safe to assume that 
Congress considered the interests of the nondisabled and chose to 
protect disabled individuals instead. 
B.   A Narrow View of Barnett 
 Furthermore, even if Barnett’s holding is limited to conflicts under 
seniority systems and reassignment to vacant positions, there is no 
statutory support for such a holding.85 There is absolutely nothing in 
the ADA’s legislative history to support the Court’s holding in Bar-
nett.86 In fact, the legislative history suggests the opposite—that 
Congress intended the obligation to transfer a disabled employee to a 
vacant position to be a very broad one.87 In one Senate Report, it 
states,  
Reasonable accommodation may also include reassignment to a 
vacant position. If an employee, because of his disability, can no 
longer perform the essential functions of the job that she or he has 
held, a transfer to another vacant job for which the person is quali-
fied may prevent the employee from being out of work and the em-
ployer from losing a valuable worker.88  
The report also contains language supporting the EEOC’s position 
that “efforts should be made to accommodate an employee . . . before 
reassignment should be considered,” and to ensure that reassign-
ment is only possible to a vacant position.89 “ ‘[B]umping’ another 
employee out of a position to create a vacancy is not required.”90  
                                                                                                                     
 85. There is some argument that Barnett is not so limited. See supra notes 75-79 and 
accompanying text.  
 86.  See Rebecca Pirius, “Seniority Rules”: Disabled Employees’ Rights Under the ADA 
Give Way to More Senior Employees—U.S. Airways v. Barnett, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 
1481, 1499 (2003) (arguing that the Court’s ruling in Barnett ignores the legislative history 
regarding the effect of seniority systems under the ADA). Some would argue that there is 
little sense in referring to legislative history because it cannot possibly represent what 
Congress thought. COLKER, supra note 11, at 208 (quoting Justice Scalia, referring to the 
“fairyland in which legislative history reflects what was in Congress’s mind”). 
 87. Cf. COLKER, supra note 11, at 23 (stating that courts have generally ignored the 
legislative history of the ADA and have thus interpreted the statute very narrowly). 
 88. S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 31-32 (1989). 
 89. Id. at 32. 
 90. Id.  
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 As stated earlier, it would have been easy for Congress to add a 
limitation under the reasonable accommodation provision or undue 
hardship provision precluding an accommodation that would cause 
an employer to violate a seniority system, whether that system was 
one derived through collective bargaining or unilaterally imposed by 
the employer. Other commentators have criticized the Barnett deci-
sion, pointing out that there is no seniority system defense in the 
text of the ADA.91 In fact, such an exception was deliberately left out 
because “seniority systems, virtually always established by nondis-
abled constituencies, were viewed as part of the problem the ADA 
was designed to address.”92  
 While the Senate Report discusses collective bargaining agree-
ments,93 it does not mention seniority systems that are not imple-
mented through a contract—such as the unilaterally imposed one in 
Barnett. Even with respect to collective bargaining agreements, the 
history follows the regulations promulgated under Section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act—that an employer’s “ ‘obligation to comply with 
[the Act] is not affected by any inconsistent term of any collective 
bargaining agreement to which it is a party.’ ”94  
 The legislative history does state that a collective bargaining 
agreement could be relevant in determining whether an accommoda-
tion is reasonable. “[I]f a collective bargaining agreement reserves 
certain jobs for employees with a given amount of seniority, it may be 
considered as a factor in determining whether it is a reasonable ac-
commodation to assign an employee with a disability without senior-
ity to that job.”95 This sentence is the only arguably relevant lan-
guage in the legislative history, and yet, for several reasons, it does 
more to undermine the Supreme Court’s position in Barnett than to 
support it. First, the mailroom position in Barnett was not reserved 
for someone with more seniority than Barnett. Barnett had enough 
seniority for the job—there was simply someone who had more sen-
iority than he did.  
 Second, the comparative lack of seniority is simply one factor to be 
considered and could presumably be outweighed by other factors—
                                                                                                                     
 91. E.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger, Sociolegal Backlash, in BACKLASH AGAINST THE 
ADA 340, 350 (Linda Hamilton Krieger ed., 2006); see also Matthew B. Robinson, Com-
ment, Reasonable Accommodation vs. Seniority in the Application of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 179, 204 (2003) (noting that “[b]oth the House 
and the Senate Reports contain language to the effect that seniority policies are but 
one factor in determining whether an accommodation of a disabled employee would be 
a reasonable accommodation”). 
 92. Krieger, supra note 93, at 350.  
 93. S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 32. 
 94. Id. (stating that “[a]n employer cannot use a collective bargaining agreement to 
accomplish what it otherwise would be prohibited from doing”) (quoting 45 C.F.R. 84.11(c)). 
 95. Id. 
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such as the fact that the disabled employee stood to lose his job with-
out the transfer. In fact, in discussing the effect of collective bargain-
ing agreements, the House Report also states, “[T]he [collective bar-
gaining] agreement would not be determinative on the issue.”96  
 Third, and perhaps more importantly, the situation in Barnett did 
not involve a collective bargaining agreement.97 Violating a collective 
bargaining agreement through the provision of an accommodation 
could be relevant to the undue hardship analysis because an em-
ployer could be financially liable to the nondisabled employee for 
breaching the collective bargaining agreement.98 However, in the 
situation in Barnett—involving a unilaterally imposed and modifi-
able at will seniority system99—the threat of litigation by the nondis-
abled employees is minimal.  
 Fourth, the statement quoted above (regarding the collective bar-
gaining agreement as a factor) is qualified by a statement in the 
same report that “[c]onflicts between provisions of a collective bar-
gaining agreement and an employer’s duty to provide reasonable ac-
commodations may be avoided by ensuring that agreements negoti-
ated after the effective date of this title contain a provision permit-
ting the employer to take all actions necessary to comply with this 
legislation.”100 Because Congress believed that employers and unions 
should negotiate their collective bargaining agreements to allow for 
accommodations under the ADA, it certainly seems that a unilater-
ally imposed seniority system should contain a provision allowing for 
accommodations under the ADA. Because Congress discussed in 
some detail collective bargaining agreements, the absence of any 
mention of the issue in Barnett—seniority systems that are unilater-
ally imposed—speaks volumes.101 
                                                                                                                     
 96. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 63 (1990); see also Christopher & Rice, supra note 
26, at 781 (noting that a collective bargaining agreement is not dispositive of the issue and 
suggesting that if the transfer is the only reasonable means of accommodating the em-
ployee, “[s]everal congressional committee reports suggest that the employer would have to 
disregard the [collective bargaining] agreement”). This is significant because under the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, courts were automatically deferring to the collective bargaining 
agreements, but “[i]n the ADA, Congress rejected that automatic deference.” Feldblum, su-
pra note 20, at 68. 
 97. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 394 (2002). 
 98. See Befort, supra note 24, at 982 (arguing that the courts should focus on the un-
due hardship analysis, rather than the reasonableness factor). Befort suggests this pro-
posal because he believes most transfer policies are enacted for the benefit of the employer, 
not the employees. See id. at 980. Accordingly, under the undue hardship analysis, “[i]f a 
nondisabled employee has a legal entitlement to a vacant position under such a system,” 
then reassignment would be inappropriate. Id. at 981. 
 99. Supra notes 47, 53 and accompanying text.  
 100. S. REP. NO 101-116, at 32 (1989).  
 101. See Barnett, 535 U.S. at 422 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing “that if Congress 
considered [collectively bargained] agreement[s] no more than a factor in the [ADA] analy-
sis, surely no greater weight was meant for a seniority scheme like the one before us, uni-
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 Finally, the lack of a statutory exemption for seniority systems of 
any type (collectively bargained or unilaterally imposed) is another 
clear signal that Congress did not intend the result in Barnett. When 
drafting the ADA, Congress relied in part on the antidiscrimination 
provisions of Title VII,102 which contain a statutory exemption for 
seniority systems: “Notwithstanding any other provision of this sub-
chapter, it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an em-
ployer to apply different standards of compensation, or different 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona 
fide seniority or merit system . . . .”103 Because Congress was most 
certainly aware of the seniority system protection in Title VII, its 
omission of such a provision in the ADA is very significant.104 
 Accordingly, the Barnett Court erred by holding that seniority sys-
tems trump an employer’s duty to provide reasonable accommoda-
tions.105 Not only did Congress not contemplate carving out such an 
exception, but doing so does not logically make sense. The main ar-
gument one can make in support of treating seniority systems differ-
ently is that they have an effect on other employees in that the non-
disabled employees have expectations to be treated in accordance 
with the rules of the seniority system. However, most accommoda-
tions have an effect on other employees; some effects are just more 
subtle.106 For instance, accommodating an employee with a night vi-
sion impairment by giving him the day shift would require other em-
ployees to work the night shift more often.107 Accommodating an em-
ployee with a lifting restriction might mean that a nondisabled em-
                                                                                                                     
laterally imposed by the employer, and, unlike collective-bargaining agreements, not sin-
gled out for protection by any positive federal statute”). 
 102. COLKER, supra note 11, at 6 (stating that Congress relied on the racial nondis-
crimination standards in Title VII. 
 103. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (2000). 
 104. See, e.g., Barnett, 535 U.S. at 420-21 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that after 
Congress realized there was dissonance between seniority systems and antidiscrimination 
legislation, Congress decided to limit the deference afforded to seniority systems and col-
lective bargaining agreements under the ADA); MEZEY, supra note 84, at 62 (stating that 
the majority in Barnett ignored congressional intent by preferring the seniority system be-
cause Congress did not exempt seniority systems under the ADA like it did under Title 
VII); Pirius, supra note 86, at 1482-83 (stating that, inapposite from Title VII, “Congress 
decided to limit the deference afforded to seniority systems and collective bargaining 
agreements under the ADA”). 
 105. Cf. Seth D. Harris, Re-Thinking the Economics of Discrimination: US Airways v. 
Barnett, the ADA, and the Application of Internal Labor Market Theory, 89 IOWA L. REV. 
123, 180-84 (2003) (arguing that the Barnett decision needed further analysis to see if the 
seniority system provided enough benefit to outweigh the disadvantage of violating the 
seniority system by accommodating the employee with a disability).  
 106. See Anderson, supra note 75, at 37-39 (arguing that the Barnett decision will hurt 
other employees with disabilities because many other accommodations affect other employees). 
 107. But see LaResca v. Am. Tel. & Tel., 161 F. Supp. 2d 323, 326, 335 (D.N.J. 2001) 
(holding that an employer was not obligated to accommodate the day shift preference of an 
employee with a seizure disorder who could not drive at night). 
2007]                           REASONABLE BURDENS 331 
 
ployee has to do more than his fair share of the heavy lifting. Provid-
ing a leave of absence to a disabled employee might necessitate other 
employees working longer hours or working harder to make up the 
difference.108 And of course, allowing a disabled employee to transfer 
to a vacant position might affect another employee who wanted that 
same position. Yet all of these accommodations are mentioned as 
possible accommodations under the ADA.109 It is nonsensical to as-
sume that Congress would put limitations on some of the listed ac-
commodations but not all of them. Accordingly, the Court’s opinion 
in Barnett, which announced a separate rule for reassignments, is 
simply incorrect. 
 The Court in Barnett also based its decision to protect seniority 
systems on “the linguistically similar Rehabilitation Act.”110 How-
ever, this reliance is misplaced because the reassignment accommo-
dation was not included in the regulations implementing the Reha-
bilitation Act of 1973.111 While most accommodations are taken from 
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, reassignment is new to the 
ADA.112 Under the Rehabilitation Act, courts were divided as to 
whether reassignment was a reasonable accommodation.113 Congress 
decided to clear up the confusion by explicitly listing it as an accom-
modation, yet because of the concerns of employers, Congress added 
language that reassignment is only appropriate to a “vacant posi-
tion.”114 This fact leads to the reasonable inference that Congress had 
some concern for other employees; they should not be bumped out of 
                                                                                                                     
 108. Alex B. Long, The ADA’s Reasonable Accommodation Requirement and “Innocent 
Third Parties,” 68 MO. L. REV. 863, 870 (2003). 
 109. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2000). 
 110. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 403 (2002). 
 111. Katie Eyer, Rehabilitation Act Redux, 23 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 271, 297 (2005) 
(stating that “[p]rior to the passage of the ADA, reassignment to another position was gen-
erally not considered a ‘reasonable’ accommodation under [the Rehabilitation Act]”); Feld-
blum, supra note 20, at 63-64; Alex Long, State Antidiscrimination Law as a Model for 
Amending the Americans with Disabilities Act, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 597, 611-12 (2004) (stat-
ing that courts almost uniformly held that reassignment was not a required accommoda-
tion under the Rehabilitation Act); Sarah Shaw, Why Courts Cannot Deny ADA Protection 
to Plaintiffs Who Do Not Use Available Mitigating Measures for Their Impairments, 90 
CAL. L. REV. 1981, 1989 n.25 (2002) (stating that “[p]rior to the enactment of the ADA, the 
most comprehensive federal legislation prohibiting disability discrimination by employees 
was the Rehabilitation Act of 1973”); Sandy Andrikopoulos & Theo E. M. Gould, Note, Liv-
ing in Harmony? Reasonable Accommodations, Employee Expectations and US Airways, 
Inc. v. Barnett, 20 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 345, 363-64 (2003) (arguing that the Barnett 
Court erred in relying on Rehabilitation Act precedent because there are differences be-
tween the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, most notably the provision of the reassignment 
accommodation under the ADA but not under the Rehabilitation Act). 
 112. Feldblum, supra note 20, at 63. 
 113. Matthew Graham Zagrodzky, Comment, When Employees Become Disabled: Does 
the Americans with Disabilities Act Require Consideration of a Transfer as a Reasonable 
Accommodation?, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 939, 949-53 (1997). 
 114. Feldblum, supra note 20, at 63. 
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their job in order to make way for an employee with a disability.115 
However, Congress did not put any further limitation on the reas-
signment accommodation. It very easily could have listed reassign-
ment to a vacant position as a potential accommodation and added 
this exception: “unless another employee has superior seniority 
rights and/or is more qualified for the position.” It chose not to.  
IV.   ARRIVING AT AN AMENDMENT 
A.   Other Scholarship on Barnett: Alex Long’s Proposal 
 After Barnett was decided, several notes, comments, and articles 
were written referencing the Barnett case.116 While many of these 
pieces were critical of Barnett, few offered any concrete proposals for 
change and none of their analyses go far enough to solve the prob-
lems left by the Barnett decision.117 Some scholars have criticized the 
Barnett decision and suggested that the inquiry of whether an em-
ployer is obligated to transfer an employee to a vacant position when 
someone else has more seniority turns on the legitimacy of the co-
worker’s expectations for uniform treatment under the seniority sys-
                                                                                                                     
 115. Id. 
 116. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 75, at 34-43 (discussing Barnett’s likely impact on 
the transfer and assignment policies of employers that go beyond issues of seniority); 
Stephen F. Befort, Accommodation at Work: Lessons from the Americans with Disabilities 
Act and Possibilities for Alleviating the American Worker Time Crunch, 13 CORNELL J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 615, 625-26 (2004); Befort, supra note 24, at 967-83 (agreeing with the result in 
Barnett but suggesting a different test); Stephen F. Befort, The Most Difficult ADA Rea-
sonable Accommodation Issues: Reassignment and Leave of Absence, 37 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 439, 458-59 (2002); Barbara L. Campbell, U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett: Did the Su-
preme Court Further Cloud, Rather than Clarify the “Reasonable Accommodation” Re-
quirement Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, in Light of Barnett?, 28 T. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 101, 104 (2002) (criticizing the result in Barnett, in part because of its 
lack of clarity); Long, supra note 108, at 893-97 (agreeing with the result but not the rea-
soning of Barnett); Andrikopoulos & Gould, supra note 111, at 377-78 (arguing that the 
Barnett decision was too ambiguous and suggesting that the reassignment decision should 
turn on whether the employer has reserved the right to make exceptions to seniority sys-
tems); Paul L. Nevin, Note, “No Longer Caught  in the Middle?”: Barnett Seniority System 
Ruling Eliminates Managements’ Dilemma with ADA Reasonable Accommodation, 41 
BRANDEIS L.J. 199, 225-27 (2002) (concluding that “[a]lthough the Supreme Court’s rever-
sal in U.S. Airways provides greater predictability for management and other employees, it 
reduces the effectiveness of reassignment as an accommodation for persons with disabili-
ties); Robinson, supra note 91, at 204-11 (disagreeing with the result in Barnett in part be-
cause of the legislative history of the ADA as well as the fact that the risk to the employer 
of litigation by the nondisabled, nontransferred employee is minimal); Blake Sonne, Note, 
Employment Law: Reasonable Accommodation Under the Americans with Disabilities Act 
vs. Employee Seniority Rights: Understanding the Real Conflict in U.S. Airways v. Barnett, 
57 OKLA. L. REV. 225, 226 (2004) (arguing that the decision was wrong because it gave dis-
abled employees too much).  
 117. The problems I am referring to are the fact that the Barnett decision results in the 
lawful termination of valuable employees with disabilities and the decision leaves quite a 
bit of uncertainty in its future applications. 
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tem.118 Others believe that the only limitation on the duty to accom-
modate an employee with a disability is the undue hardship de-
fense.119 Many scholars have criticized the approach taken by the ma-
jority in the Barnett case but do not offer any reasonable alterna-
tive.120 One scholar, however, did offer a concrete proposal for change 
and his article warrants further discussion.  
 In Professor Alex Long’s article, The ADA’s Reasonable Accommo-
dation Requirement and “Innocent Third Parties,”121 he attempts to 
provide a solution to the problem of an accommodation’s effect on 
other employees.122 Long focuses on how an employer’s duty to pro-
vide reasonable accommodations to employees with disabilities af-
fects “innocent third parties,” that is, the coemployees of the disabled 
employee.123 He suggests that courts need to focus on how a reason-
able accommodation might affect coemployees, but he criticizes other 
tests, including the Supreme Court’s approach in Barnett.124  
 Long correctly points out that the greatest conflict over reasonable 
accommodations is not the costs levied on employers but the negative 
effect accommodations might have on other employees.125 While he be-
lieves that many needed accommodations have no effect on coworkers 
because they simply involve a cost to the employer, such as modifying 
the structural aspects of a disabled employee’s workplace,126 he also 
notes what has been emphasized here—that many other accommoda-
tions have a more prominent effect on other employees.127 
 Regarding the most controversial accommodation, reassignment, 
Long acknowledges the severity of the impact on the disabled em-
ployee if he is denied reassignment, yet finds significance in the 
harm to the nondisabled employees if the employee with the disabil-
ity is accommodated.128 He states: 
As reassignment is the accommodation of last resort, if a disabled 
employee is denied the vacancy, the employee will be out of a job 
                                                                                                                     
 118. See, e.g., Befort, supra note 24, at 979-80; Andrikopoulos & Gould, supra note 111, 
at 377-81.  
 119. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 75, at 41-43. 
 120. See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 116; Nevin, supra note 116; Robinson, supra note 
91. 
 121. Long, supra note 108, at 893. 
 122. Id. at 866. 
 123. Id. at 866, 878, 893-905. 
 124. Id. at 893-97. 
 125. Id. at 869. 
 126. Id. at 869. This analysis fails to take into account that money spent by the em-
ployer on a disabled employee is money that cannot be spent on other employees in terms 
of wage increases and other benefits. If one assumes that the employer will want the same 
profit, then the pot of money to spend on employees necessarily decreases when an em-
ployer is spending money on a reasonable accommodation for a disabled employee.  
 127. See id. at 869-73. 
 128. Id. at 884. 
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and, because of his or her disability, may have difficulty obtaining 
a new job. If a better qualified employee is denied the vacancy, 
presumably he or she will still have a job, just not the job desired. 
However, the impact on the better qualified employee could be 
more than de minimis. For whatever reason, the employee desired 
to move into the new position, so presumably the employee consid-
ered the vacant position to be an improvement over the employee’s 
current position. Moreover, the vacant position may objectively be 
an improvement over the current position even though it is not 
technically a promotion.129  
 Long criticizes the courts’ approaches as a “standardless grab 
bag.”130 While Long believes that the majority’s opinion in Barnett 
reached the right result, he criticizes how the majority arrived at its 
decision.131 He states that the focus of the majority’s opinion was on 
the other employees’ expectation of consistent, uniform treatment 
and argues that this focus provides little guidance to lower courts in 
cases not involving seniority rules.132 Instead, he argues, the court’s 
emphasis should be on the tangible effects such decisions “have on 
other employees, rather than the effects of the accommodation on the 
‘expectations of consistent, uniform treatment’ of other employees.”133  
 In articulating his own test, Long first argues that Congress did 
not intend to remedy the problems of individuals with disabilities by 
requiring that employers take action that would cause other employ-
ees to suffer a materially adverse impact, although he recognizes 
that much of the scholarship in this area takes exactly the opposite 
stance—that the noncontractual rights of other employees are of sec-
ondary importance to the interests of a disabled employee.134  
 Based on his belief that the rights of nondisabled coworkers 
should not be ignored, Long proposed the following rule: “that a pro-
posed accommodation is not reasonable when it would violate the 
contractual rights of another employee or otherwise result in an ad-
verse employment action (as that term is defined through retaliation 
case law) for a nondisabled employee.”135  
B.   Long’s Missing Link: Comparing the Consequences 
 While Long’s approach makes sense from a doctrinal perspective 
(because it could be easily applied by using current case law) and 
                                                                                                                     
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 897. 
 131. Id. at 896. 
 132. Id. at 897. 
 133. Id.  
 134. Id. at 898. I, of course, disagree with his assertion that Congress did not believe 
that eliminating discrimination against individuals with disabilities was more important 
than protecting nondisabled employees. See supra Part III. 
 135. Id. at 901. 
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seems to make sense from a fairness perspective (because it only de-
nies disabled employees an accommodation if such accommodation 
would result in an adverse employment action for the other employ-
ees), it fails to take into account the relative degree of harm to the 
two parties. If a disabled employee is denied an accommodation, he is 
out of a job, whereas the nondisabled employee who does not get the 
transfer still has his job.136 This disparity in consequences is trou-
bling, and the fact that it can be accomplished despite the ADA’s 
clear goal of providing equal opportunity to disabled employees is 
even more disturbing.  
 Because of this disparity in consequences, I sought to develop a 
balancing test, which I refer to as the “comparative consequences 
test.” The idea of this test is to compare the consequences to the dis-
abled employee if the accommodation is not granted with the conse-
quences to the nondisabled employee if the accommodation is 
granted. However, when applying this test, one finds that the balanc-
ing test is rather a heavy-handed one that often leads to requiring an 
accommodation. The reason for this result is that most accommoda-
tions that significantly affect other employees—such as a reassign-
ment accommodation—are “accommodation[s] of last resort.”137 In 
other words, the employer has considered and dismissed all other po-
tential accommodations that would allow the employee to remain in 
his current position and therefore has determined that reassignment 
is the only option left. If the reassignment accommodation is not 
given, termination will result.138  
 Accordingly, the balancing test would only favor the nondisabled 
employee if an accommodation would lead to the nondisabled em-
ployee’s termination—admittedly, a relatively rare occurrence. 
Therefore, instead of suggesting Congress adopt a balancing test 
with its uncertainty and accompanying inefficiencies, this Article 
proposes a bright line rule that would be easy to apply and would 
most often reach the same result as the balancing test.139  
C.   The Amendment 
 This proposed amendment would add language to the reasonable 
accommodation provision stating, “An accommodation of last resort 
                                                                                                                     
 136. Ball, supra note 12, at 987 n.209. 
 137. Cravens v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kansas City, 214 F.3d 1011, 1019 (8th Cir. 
2000). 
 138. It should be noted that if there is another accommodation that would not infringe 
(as much) on other employees’ interests, the employer is free to choose that accommoda-
tion, as an employer is not required to give a disabled employee his preferred accommoda-
tion, only a reasonable one. 
 139. For a discussion on why it is fair to place the burden of accommodation on other 
employees, see infra Part VI.B. 
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should not be deemed unreasonable because of its effect on other em-
ployees or its violation of a seniority system or other neutral policy of 
an employer UNLESS its provision would result in the involuntary 
termination of another employee.” According to this amendment, a 
requested accommodation would be deemed unreasonable only if the 
accommodation would lead to the involuntary termination of the 
nondisabled employee.140 
1.   Why Termination? 
 Application of this amendment would obviously lead to a different 
result in Barnett. Even though someone might consider a transfer ex-
tremely important, not getting the transfer but remaining employed 
is still less severe than the harm to the disabled employee if the ac-
commodation is not granted (termination).141 At worst, the nondis-
abled transfer seeker can remain in his position until another posi-
tion becomes vacant while the worst-case scenario for the disabled 
employee is much more severe: loss of job.142  
                                                                                                                     
 140. The reader should keep in mind that even if an accommodation is deemed reason-
able pursuant to this amendment, the employer still has the opportunity to demonstrate 
that the accommodation creates an undue hardship. This might occur if the employer 
was subject to significant legal liability because the accommodation violates an em-
ployee’s contractual rights. 
 141. Ball, supra note 12, at 962 (“Disabled employees, once they are bumped from their 
jobs by more senior employees, have fewer options than their able-bodied counterparts . . . . 
In contrast, when able-bodied employees are bumped from their current positions by more 
senior employees, there is a greater likelihood that they will be able to find other positions 
within the company”). Professor Anderson also makes an argument similar to the one in 
this Article: that the employees denied the transfer given to the employee with a disability 
are not harmed that much. See Anderson, supra note 75, at 42. Rather, their attainment of 
a transfer is likely just delayed while the individual with a disability would be out of a job 
without an accommodation. Id. As an aside, one could also argue that allowing the accom-
modation transfer is beneficial to the employer as well, because it saves the employer the 
administrative costs of replacing the disabled employee. Such costs are estimated at 
roughly forty times the cost of the average accommodation. Peter David Blanck, The Eco-
nomics of the Employment Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act: Part I—
Workplace Accommodations, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 877, 903 (1997). 
 142. Befort, supra note 24, at 982-83.  
Consider, in this regard, the respective fates of two employees—one disabled 
and one not—who each desire the same vacant position. If the disabled em-
ployee is denied the requested transfer, he or she is out of a job. Since reas-
signment is the accommodation of last resort, the opportunity to be placed in 
this vacant position represents the disabled employee’s “last chance” to remain 
employed with that particular employer. In contrast, the consequences suffered 
by the nondisabled employee who does not obtain the desired transfer are less 
severe. The nondisabled worker remains employed in his or her current posi-
tion, and the chance to move into a more desirable position is deferred rather 
than lost. Given this significant disparity in consequences, the scale generally 
should tip in favor of the disabled employee in the absence of a showing of an 
undue hardship. 
Id. 
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 In balancing the conflicting interests of the employees, the line is 
drawn at termination. The rationale for this decision is based on the 
severity of termination. Many scholars have suggested that termina-
tion is the workplace equivalent of “capital punishment.”143 Many 
people have their whole life identity wrapped up in their job and oc-
cupation.144 For them, termination means not only a loss of regular 
paychecks but also  “dashed expectations as to future benefits, a loss 
of character and personal identity, and the loss of the financial security 
one expected.”145 Another scholar has said this about termination: 
Dismissal affects a person’s economic, emotional, and physical 
health in ways unparalleled by less drastic forms of discipline or 
transitory interruptions of work. Not only does dismissal have 
immediate financial consequences for the discharged worker, it 
also has an economic impact into the future . . . . The loss of one’s 
job is felt not only by the individual worker, but by members of his 
or her family and the community . . . . If the termination is the re-
sult of factors other than an employee’s conduct or performance, 
the loss can be devastating.146 
While some might argue that not getting a desired transfer (as in 
Barnett) is fairly serious, in the world of the workplace, most would 
agree that remaining employed is the single most important concern 
for the vast majority of employees.  
 While I recognize that Congress did not intend to protect nondis-
abled individuals under the ADA,147 fairness, justice, and a pragmatic 
concern—that failing to protect nondisabled coworkers increases hos-
tility against disabled employees—leads me to the conclusion that an 
accommodation should not be given if it results in the termination of 
another employee. There is no faster way of ensuring hostility toward 
the disabled community than taking away job security of other employ-
ees, which is at the heart of the benefits sought by most employees.148 
                                                                                                                     
 143. Lorraine A. Schmall, Keeping Employer Promises When Relational Incentives No 
Longer Pertain: “Right Sizing” and Employee Benefits, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 276, 277-78 
(2000); Donna E. Young, Racial Releases, Involuntary Separations, and Employment At-
Will, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 351, 352 (2001) (quoting MARK A. ROTHSTEIN & LANCE LIEBMAN, 
EMPLOYMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 910 (4th ed. 1998)) (stating that “job termina-
tion has been called the ‘capital punishment’ of employee relations”). 
 144. See Schmall, supra note 143, at 278. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Young, supra note 143, at 353. 
 147. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text (noting that the ADA narrowly de-
fines the class of persons who can sue under the statute, thereby precluding a reverse dis-
crimination lawsuit). 
 148. Sharon Rabin Margalioth, The Significance of Worker Attitudes: Individualism as 
a Cause for Labor’s Decline, 16 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 133, 144 (1998).  
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2.   Application and Limitations (Bumping) 
 Generally, this rule would be easy to apply. There are some fac-
tual scenarios, however, that would not be so easily resolved. Sup-
pose both a disabled and a nondisabled employee want a transfer to a 
vacant position, and suppose the nondisabled employee has more 
seniority. We must also assume for purposes of this example that (1) 
the vacant position has different hours or more flexible hours than 
the current position in which the nondisabled employee is working; 
(2) she is seeking the vacant job because it better suits her child care 
arrangements; and (3) she has decided that if she does not get the 
position, she will quit her job and look for something more flexible. 
While this represents a close call,149 the scales would tip in favor of 
the disabled employee because termination would be voluntary for 
the nondisabled employee, whereas if the accommodation were not 
granted, termination for the disabled employee would be involuntary. 
Furthermore, it is likely more difficult for an individual with a dis-
ability to find a job than a nondisabled employee.150 Finally, the em-
ployer has a legal obligation to accommodate the disabled employee 
and does not have a similar obligation with respect to the nondis-
abled employee.151 
 Admittedly, under this proposed amendment, there are not many 
scenarios where the nondisabled employee’s interests would trump 
the interests of the disabled employee—I can imagine one. Suppose 
an employer is preparing to engage in a mass layoff, and suppose 
both a disabled employee and a nondisabled employee with more sen-
iority attempt to transfer to another department that will not be 
affected by the layoff. In this case, both employees are threatened 
with loss of their jobs and the rights of the disabled employee 
should not trump.152  
                                                                                                                     
 149. This is an especially difficult issue for me to resolve because I care deeply about 
issues surrounding working mothers, and I think employers should offer more flexibility to 
working mothers. See generally Nicole Buonocore Porter, Re-Defining Superwoman: An Es-
say on Overcoming the “Maternal Wall” in the Legal Workplace, 13 DUKE J. GENDER L. & 
POL’Y 55 (2006) (discussing the maternal wall problem in the legal workplace and propos-
ing solutions for dealing with discrimination against mothers in the workplace). Some have 
argued that the reasonable accommodation principle should apply to other contexts; it is 
my sincere hope that the ADA will result in employers realizing there are benefits to re-
structuring positions and other accommodations given to the disabled and that this will re-
sult in a willingness to expand these accommodations to nondisabled employees, including 
working mothers. 
 150. Long, supra note 108, at 884. 
 151. If in fact the employer had a legal obligation to give the nondisabled employee the 
preferred shift (perhaps under an FMLA obligation), then the employer should give the 
schedule variance in the nondisabled employee’s current position. 
 152. I recognize that the harm from termination is likely to be worse for the disabled 
employee because it likely will be more difficult for him to find a job. However, based on 
the severity of termination and the concern for hostility, this result is the correct one. 
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 This amendment is subject to limitations. The proposed amend-
ment would adhere to the statutory language of only allowing an ac-
commodation to a “vacant” position.153 Accordingly, an employer 
would not be required to bump a nondisabled employee out of his po-
sition so that the disabled employee could have the physically easier 
job because presumably bumping an employee out of his job would 
result in that employee’s termination. There might be situations 
where an employer could force an employee out of his position to 
make room for a disabled employee but then assign the displaced 
employee to another position of similar quality and pay. In this situa-
tion, one could argue that bumping a nondisabled employee does not 
lead to his termination and, therefore, the proposed amendment 
should allow the bumping. However, that result is unjustifiable for a 
couple of reasons.  
 First, it would be directly contradictory to the statutory language 
of the ADA.154 While this Article has suggested an amendment to the 
ADA, the amendment is consistent with the legislative history and 
statutory language of the Act. In other words, it is my belief that if 
Congress had given sufficient attention to the conflict between dis-
abled employees and nondisabled employees, it likely would have 
supported a result similar to the one this Article is advocating. On 
the other hand, Congress did give sufficient attention to the issue of 
bumping and decided that bumping would not be required.155  
 A second justification for not allowing disabled employees to bump 
other employees can be gleaned from the endowment effect discussed 
by social scientists.156 Applying this theory lends support for my posi-
tion that bumping an employee from his position is qualitatively 
worse than allowing a disabled employee to transfer to a vacant posi-
tion ahead of a nondisabled employee. The endowment effect theo-
rizes that individuals value entitlements they are in possession of 
more than ones they are not.157 A related theory, and perhaps one 
that is more relevant in this context, is the status quo bias, which 
theorizes that “individuals tend to prefer the present state of the 
                                                                                                                     
 153. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (2000). 
 154. The reasonable accommodation provision states that an appropriate accommoda-
tion might be “reassignment to a vacant position.” Id. § 12111(9)(B) (emphasis added). 
 155. See S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 31-32 (1989) (indicating that no bumping is required 
to transfer a disabled employee). 
 156. See Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1227, 1228 (2003) (describing the endowment effect as “the principal that people tend 
to value goods more when they own them than when they do not”). A disclaimer is needed. 
I am not a social scientist, and this Article does not purport to undertake an in-depth 
analysis of the endowment effect. Instead, I am merely using evidence of this effect to sup-
port what is very intuitive to me: that being bumped from your current job is substantively 
more unfair and troubling than not being allowed a transfer to a job you do not yet have. 
 157. Id. 
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world to alternative states, all other things being equal.”158 Research-
ers are not quite sure what causes the endowment effect, but one hy-
pothesis is relevant here: it has been suggested that loss aversion is a 
cause of the endowment effect and that this loss aversion may occur 
“because individuals form attachments to what they own.”159 This 
seems especially true with jobs. Even despite our society’s increased 
mobility in the workforce, many individuals view even a voluntary 
job change with trepidation, and being forced from one’s job, even if 
placed in another position, would certainly increase that emotional 
response. Accordingly, the endowment effect explains the intuitive 
conclusion that bumping an employee from his job is worse than not 
allowing him to transfer into a new position because a disabled em-
ployee is placed in the new position instead.  
 One might argue that allowing a disabled employee to transfer 
into a position ahead of a nondisabled employee with more seniority 
is taking away the seniority rights of the nondisabled employee, to 
which he undoubtedly has a strong sense of entitlement. I do not dis-
agree that employees operating under a seniority system have a 
strong interest in their competitive seniority within the company. 
Competitive seniority not only determines transfers but dictates 
shifts, layoffs, and recall from layoffs.160 The more seniority an em-
ployee has, the more protection he has from being subject to a lay-
off.161 But this proposed amendment does not take away the nondis-
abled employee’s seniority and does not put the disabled employee 
ahead of the nondisabled employee in the seniority queue. It only af-
fects one transfer to one position. As has been stated by many other 
scholars who criticized the result in the Barnett decision, if the non-
disabled employee did not get the desired transfer, he would still 
have the opportunity and the requisite seniority to transfer into the 
next available position in which he was interested.162 Accordingly, 
this proposal does not take away the seniority rights of nondisabled 
employees; it only requires one transfer at one time when necessary 
to keep a valuable employee employed. 
 Finally, this proposed amendment is not the only limitation on the 
reasonable accommodation requirement. This amendment does not 
negate the undue hardship defense, and there are many accommoda-
tions that would truly pose such a hardship to employers.163 This pro-
                                                                                                                     
 158. Id. at 1228-29. 
 159. Id. at 1251. 
 160. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 404-05 (2002); Franks v. Bowman 
Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 766-67 (1976). 
 161. See Barnett, 535 U.S. at 404; Franks, 424 U.S. at 766. 
 162. See Befort, supra note 24, at 982-83. 
 163. Befort, supra note 24, at 981-82; see also Anderson, supra note 75, at 41 (arguing 
that these issues should turn on the undue hardship analysis, which supports Congress’s 
intent in wanting to rid of the overprotection of employer’s policies that serve to subordi-
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posed amendment would be limited to the situation where the ac-
commodation does not pose any undue hardship to the employer 
based on an analysis of the factors (and is in fact often costless)164 but 
does negatively affect other nondisabled coworkers. Put another way, 
this amendment only determines the reasonableness of the accommoda-
tion. It does not answer the next question in the analysis—whether the 
accommodation creates an undue hardship for the employer.  
V.   JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT 
A.   Achieving Equal Opportunity 
 The legislative history of the ADA indicates that discrimination 
results not only “from actions or inactions that discriminate by effect 
as well as by intent or design”165 but also from the “adoption or appli-
cation of standards, criteria, practices or procedures that are based 
on thoughtlessness or indifference—that discrimination resulting 
from benign neglect.”166 Accordingly, Congress declared that “the Na-
tion’s proper goal[ ] regarding individuals with disabilities [is] to as-
sure equality of opportunity.”167 Because Congress sought to give 
equal opportunity to individuals with disabilities, it sensibly included 
the reasonable accommodation provision. This proposal helps to fur-
ther the goal of equal opportunity. Disabled individuals must have 
an opportunity equal to that of nondisabled employees to compete 
and work in the workplace, considered in its entirety and not just 
in one particular job.168 Critics of this proposal might argue that 
with respect to a reassignment request, simply allowing a disabled 
employee to compete for the vacant position serves the goal of 
equal opportunity because the disabled individual is being given 
the same opportunity as the nondisabled employees.169 That argu-
                                                                                                                     
nate the disabled). For instance, forcing an employer to undertake significant legal liabil-
ity, via suits by other employees, would possibly place an undue hardship on the employer. 
Thus, in situations where an employer is bound to a seniority system via contract, that 
employer might face legal liability if it violates the seniority system to give a transfer to a 
disabled employee. However, as suggested in my discussion of the legislative history, for 
collective bargaining agreements adopted after the ADA was enacted, an employer 
and a union should include a provision exempting accommodations made pursuant to 
the ADA from coverage under the collective bargaining agreement. See supra notes 
100-01 and accompanying text. 
 164. Many accommodations, in fact, cost very little or nothing. See Blanck, supra note 
141, at 902. 
 166. H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 29 (1990). 
 167. Id. 
 167. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (2000). 
 168. Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and Civil Rights Model of Disability, 
in BACKLASH AGAINST THE ADA 62, 85 (Linda Hamilton Krieger ed., 2006) (“[I]ndividual[s] 
should have access to the entire range of jobs available in the relevant labor market, not 
simply a means of obtaining some minimal foothold in the world of paid labor.”). 
 169. See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d 
1024, 1027 (7th Cir. 2000). 
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ment might make sense if the goal of equal opportunity is limited 
to one particular position.  
 However, the language and history of the ADA reveals that Con-
gress envisioned an equal opportunity goal that encompassed the en-
tire workplace of the employer and not just one position. Evidence of 
this intent can be gleaned from the fact that Congress included “re-
assignment” as a potential accommodation under the ADA.170 This 
inclusion is telling because, as stated earlier, the reassignment ac-
commodation was not included in the regulations implementing the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, from which the reasonable accommoda-
tion provision of the ADA was derived.171 The fact that Congress 
chose to add the reassignment accommodation leads to the reason-
able inference that Congress conceptualized a level of equality 
greater than simply allowing the disabled employee to have an op-
portunity to work in the one position for which he was hired; instead, 
Congress envisioned an equal opportunity goal that encompassed the 
entire workplace.  
 If the goal of the ADA is to give disabled employees an equal op-
portunity to compete and work in the workplace, defined more 
broadly to include the entire company, then this proposal serves that 
goal of equal opportunity.172 If a nondisabled employee is not given a 
transfer, he still has the opportunity to continue to work for his em-
ployer. On the other hand, if a disabled employee is not given a 
transfer, he does not have the same opportunity to work for the em-
ployer; he would be terminated.173 Thus, my proposal, which would 
most often allow transfer accommodations, furthers the ADA’s 
clearly expressed goal of equal opportunity.174  
 Other scholars have made arguments that support this approach. 
Professor Diller notes that courts’ suggestion that, rather than seek 
an accommodation, plaintiffs should find another job where no ac-
commodation is needed “runs counter to the basic proposition for 
which ADA Title I stands, that people with disabilities should have 
                                                                                                                     
 170. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2000). 
 171. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
 172. Cf. Diller, supra note 168, at 69-70 (noting that some courts suggest that the ADA 
only requires a baseline level of access to some jobs, but that this is a quite different objec-
tive than equal opportunity). Some have even gone further to suggest that equality of op-
portunity in the broad sense is the chance to lead as happy of a life as everyone else. Pam-
ela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable Accom-
modation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 25 (1996). 
 173. See Diller, supra note 168, at 75 (stating that a disabled individual’s request for 
an accommodation is not a claim for redistribution of employer assets; instead it is a claim 
for “equality, fair play, and meritocracy”). 
 174. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (2000). 
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access to the fullest possible range of jobs, within the limits of the 
reasonable accommodation principle.”175 
 Some have argued that a transfer accommodation is different 
from other accommodations because other accommodations are 
needed to eliminate the obstacles and barriers caused by the nondis-
abled majority.176 For instance, reconfiguring machines or job func-
tions is more readily seen as equal opportunity because those obsta-
cles prevent the disabled person from successfully working and were 
put in place with a bias toward the nondisabled.177 But a transfer ac-
commodation can be seen in the same light.178 The only reason a dis-
abled employee needs a transfer is because the employer is unable or 
unwilling to modify the employee’s existing job to get rid of the barri-
ers put in place without consideration of disabled individuals.179 Ac-
cordingly, a transfer accommodation is the same as any other type of ac-
commodation: it simply eliminates the subordination of the disabled 
caused by designing workplaces around the bodies of the able-bodied.180 
 While critics might argue that special or preferential treatment 
cannot be equal opportunity, other disability-rights scholars disagree 
with that assertion. As Professor Ball has argued, “the disability 
rights movement [needs] to break the taboo that accompanies a dis-
cussion of preferential treatment in our society.”181 He further states, 
[T]he basic equality goals of the ADA will remain unfulfilled un-
less we are willing to provide individuals with disabilities, when 
appropriate, with reasonable forms of preferential treatment. Such 
treatment is not inconsistent with equality of opportunity in the 
area of disability; instead . . . the former is a necessary means for 
the attainment of the latter.182 
Because our society has been designed around the able-bodied, some-
times the only way to allow a disabled individual to remain a produc-
tive member of the workforce is to grant preferential treatment in 
the form of reasonable accommodations. This proposal furthers Con-
gress’s goal of equal opportunity by giving reasonable accommoda-
                                                                                                                     
 175. Diller, supra note 168, at 69. 
 176. See Long, supra note 108, at 871-72.  
 177. See Ball, supra note 12, at 960. 
 178. See id. at 962 (arguing that even a transfer accommodation serves the goal of equal 
opportunity because the transfer does not give the disabled employee an unfair advantage). 
 179. See id. at 986-87. 
 180. Harlan Hahn, Equality & the Environment: The Interpretation of “Reasonable Ac-
commodations” in the Americans with Disabilities Act, 17 J. REHABILITATION ADMIN. 101, 
103 (1993). “Everything has been standardized for a model human being whose life is un-
touched by disability. All aspects of the built environment, including work sites, have been 
adapted for someone; the problem is that they have been adapted exclusively for the non-
disabled majority.” Id. 
 181. Ball, supra note 12, at 995. 
 182. Id. 
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tions to individuals with disabilities when doing so is necessary to al-
low such an individual to remain employed. 
B.   Providing Guidance to Employers and Courts 
 Another justification for this proposal is that it provides a bright-
line rule to give guidance to employers and courts when dealing with 
the conflicting interests of employees with and without disabilities. 
The state of the law is in flux regarding an employer’s obligation to 
accommodate a disabled employee when the accommodation affects 
other employees. If one accepts the narrow view of Barnett—that it 
only applies to reassignments which violate a seniority system—even 
that rule is subject to an exception. The Court stated in Barnett that 
ordinarily the defendant need only point to the existence of a valid 
seniority system to avoid accommodation,183 but the plaintiff can still 
demonstrate special circumstances to prove that the accommodation 
is reasonable despite the seniority system.184 Justice Scalia and oth-
ers criticized the Court’s failure to develop a bright-line rule precisely 
because the lack of a clearer standard is likely to increase litiga-
tion.185 Furthermore, as discussed earlier, some believe that Barnett 
is not limited to cases where an accommodation violates a seniority 
system.186 Because the scope of Barnett is unclear, employers, courts, 
and lawyers will continue to be confused regarding an employer’s ob-
ligation to provide reasonable accommodations when they affect 
other employees.187  
                                                                                                                     
 183. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S 391, 405-06 (2002). 
 184. Id.  
 185. Id. at 412 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Campbell, supra note 116, at 115-16 (stating 
that the majority’s decision in Barnett provides “no clarity in determining whether a reas-
signment request made by an otherwise qualified employee should be granted as [an] ex-
ception within a unilaterally imposed seniority system”); Long, supra note 108, at 892 (re-
ferring to Scalia’s characterization of the Court’s approach as a “ ‘standardless grab bag’ ”) 
(quoting Barnett, 535 U.S. at 414 (Scalia, J., dissenting)); Andrikopoulos & Gould, supra 
note 111, at 348 n.17; see also U.S. Supreme Court Bolsters the Integrity of Seniority Sys-
tems in Disability Case, MCDERMOTT NEWSLETTERS (McDermott Will & Emery), May 2002, 
http://www.mwe.com/index.cfm/fuseaction/publications.nldetail/object_id/ac74e9ae-5b01-
4a77-89f0-dda91231079b.cfm (advising employers that questions remain after the Barnett 
decision). 
 186. See supra notes 75-79. 
 187. Evidence of this confusion can be gleaned from the bulletins or newsletters writ-
ten by lawyers representing employers. For instance, attorneys from Kirkpatrick & Lock-
hart advised their clients that the Barnett rule could be extended to other disability-
neutral workplace policies. Olson & Boyer, supra note 75. They stated, “If an accommoda-
tion request violates a clearly established and closely adhered to personnel policy, and the 
accommodation would be unfair and disruptive to other employees and their expectations 
under the policy, an employer could deny the request as unreasonable.” Id. Adams & 
Reese, LLP, attorneys also questioned whether “the Supreme Court’s decision app[lies] to 
other disability-neutral employment policies that control job assignments.” Eric R. Miller 
& Paul D. Myrick, Bona Fide Seniority System Usually Trumps ADA Accommodation Re-
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 This confusion serves no one well. It increases litigation because 
employers and disabled employees (as well as their lawyers) are un-
sure of the scope of an employer’s obligation to accommodate under 
the ADA. Uncertainty in the law also harms employers because it 
leads them into the proverbial catch-22. Employers often want to fol-
low the law, and most employers would not enjoy terminating a dis-
abled employee, especially if that employee was a valuable worker 
despite his disability. But if an employer accommodates the disabled 
employee in a way that affects other employees, those employees are 
likely to protest such an action. Accordingly, employers are conflicted 
regarding whether to provide the accommodation, particularly be-
cause the law as it stands now does not dictate the result. Even with 
respect to the reassignment accommodation, Barnett does not dictate 
the result. Barnett only states that an employer is often not required 
to accommodate; it does not state that the employer cannot accom-
modate. An employer can choose to make an exception to the senior-
ity system by giving the disabled employee the transfer even though 
someone with more seniority also wants the position, especially when 
the employer’s seniority system is unilateral and the employer has 
reserved the right to modify it at will (which most employers do). 
Therefore, employers must make the difficult decision to favor either 
the disabled employee who needs the transfer to remain employed or 
the nondisabled coworkers who might be upset if the accommodation 
is given to the disabled employee.  
 This proposal takes away that discretion by providing an easily 
applied bright-line rule. While some employers might prefer to have 
that discretion, others would likely prefer having the law dictate the 
result, in part because it gives the employer a justifiable excuse for 
accommodating the disabled employee: it is required by law. If this 
proposal was enacted, eventually employers would write exceptions 
into their seniority systems to let employees know that accommodat-
ing a disabled employee does not constitute a violation of the senior-
ity system. Once this provision is known to employees, they would 
not have their expectations dashed when the employer transfers the 
disabled employee instead of the nondisabled coworkers.  
 Because disabled employees and employers stand to benefit by 
the bright-line rule proposed in this Article, Congress should enact 
this amendment. Indeed, the fact that many employers might pre-
fer this bright-line rule may help the political feasibility of the 
amendment’s enactment.  
                                                                                                                     
quest, L. & EMP. ALERT (Adams & Reese LLP), June 1, 2002,  
http://www.adamsandreese.com/pdf/alert6-01-02.pdf.  
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C.   Drawing an Analogy to Title VII 
 Since the ADA’s enactment, there have been several attempts by 
scholars to categorize the reasonable accommodation provision of the 
ADA into the broader antidiscrimination versus affirmative action 
debate.188 In other words, are accommodations necessary simply to 
achieve equal opportunity, or do accommodations tip the scales in fa-
vor of disabled individuals and therefore constitute affirmative ac-
tion?189 This subpart will briefly discuss this debate. However, re-
gardless of whether reasonable accommodations are considered nec-
essary to avoid discrimination or are considered affirmative action, 
this subpart will demonstrate that the amendment proposed in this 
Article is appropriate by drawing analogies to relatively well ac-
cepted Title VII jurisprudence.  
1.   Antidiscrimination or Affirmative Action? 
 Although the ADA was modeled in part after Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964,190 some believe it was premised on a very differ-
ent theory of equality.191 The ADA was referred to as “a ‘second gen-
eration’ civil rights statute, advancing formal and structural models 
of equality by imposing both a duty of accommodation and a duty of 
formal nondiscrimination.”192 Title VII is primarily an antidiscrimi-
nation statute193 that, except in the religion context,194 does not re-
quire an employer to take any affirmative steps on behalf of a pro-
tected employee. In fact, it forbids an employer in most instances 
from granting preferential treatment to members of a minority 
group.195 Whereas Title VII only requires an employer to treat indi-
viduals equally and not to consider any prohibited classifications 
when making an employment decision,196 the ADA is referred to as a 
                                                                                                                     
 188. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” Accommodation, and the 
Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825, 828 (2003). 
 189. This question matters to many people because traditional antidiscrimination law 
is viewed more favorably than affirmative action. 
 190. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000). 
 191. Krieger, supra note 12, at 3.  
 192. Id. at 5.  
 193. See id. at 3. 
 194. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (“The term ‘religion’ includes all aspects of religious obser-
vance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to 
reasonably accommodate to an employee’s or prospective employee’s religious observance 
or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.”); Trans 
World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977); Feldblum, supra note 20, at 66-67.  
 195. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a); but see United Steel Workers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 
193, 208 (1979) (holding that Title VII does not forbid all private, voluntary, race conscious 
affirmative action).  
 196. Krieger, supra note 12, at 3. 
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“special treatment” statute because it requires employers to some-
times treat employees differently because of their disability.197  
 In fact, some argue not only that accommodation mandates are 
substantively different from antidiscrimination mandates but that 
they actually rise to the level of affirmative action. For example, in 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Humiston-Keeling, 
Inc.,198 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected the 
EEOC’s interpretation that reassignment to a vacant position re-
quired an employer to transfer a qualified, disabled employee even if 
he was not the most qualified for the position.199 The decision, written 
by Judge Posner, referred to the EEOC’s policy as “affirmative action 
with a vengeance.”200 The allure of lumping together reasonable ac-
commodations and affirmative action is compelling. Both concepts 
require an employer to take positive steps to overcome the historic 
disadvantages experienced by the subordinated group.201  
 But these arguments do not tell the whole story, nor do they tell 
the more compelling story. From a practical perspective, reasonable 
accommodations vary from traditional affirmative action because 
reasonable accommodations focus on individuals rather than 
groups.202 On a theoretical level, many scholars have argued that ac-
commodations under the ADA simply further the goal of nondis-
crimination and are therefore not much different than other, more 
accepted antidiscrimination laws.203 These scholars make two pri-
mary arguments. First, avoiding discrimination under traditional 
                                                                                                                     
 197. Diller, supra note 168, at 65 (“The ADA’s requirement of ‘reasonable accommoda-
tion’ rests on the idea that, in some circumstances, people must be treated differently to be 
treated equally.”). 
 198. 227 F.3d 1024 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 199. Id. at 1027-29. 
 200. Id. at 1029. 
 201. Kay Schriner & Richard K. Scotch, The ADA and the Meaning of Disability, in 
BACKLASH AGAINST THE ADA, 164, 184 (Linda Hamilton Krieger ed., 2006); see also Karlan 
& Rutherglen, supra note 172, at 14 (“Reasonable accommodation is affirmative action, in 
the sense that it requires an employer to take account of an individual’s disabilities and to 
provide special treatment to him for that reason.”). Other scholars, however, note that even 
though commentators analogize affirmative action to the reasonable accommodation provi-
sion under the ADA, the statute in fact requires no affirmative action, which actually hurts 
the disabled. Marta Russell, Backlash, the Political Economy, and Structural Exclusion, in 
BACKLASH AGAINST THE ADA 254, 260 (Linda Hamilton Krieger ed., 2006). 
 202. See infra notes 250-51 and accompanying text. 
 203. See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 188, at 834-35; Mary Crossley, Reasonable Ac-
commodation as Part and Parcel of the Antidiscrimination Project, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 861, 
898-920 (2004) (arguing that the reasonable accommodation provision is very similar con-
ceptually to our other antidiscrimination theories); Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and 
Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642, 652 (2001) (arguing that other aspects of tradi-
tional antidiscrimination law, notably the disparate impact theory, are the same as ac-
commodation requirements); Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference: 
ADA Accommodations as Antidiscrimination, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 579, 580 (2004) (arguing 
that ADA-mandated accommodations are consistent with other antidiscrimination meas-
ures in that each remedies exclusion from employment opportunity). 
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antidiscrimination statutes, such as Title VII, often costs an em-
ployer money much in the same way as accommodating an employee 
under the ADA.204 Second, the perceived physical limitations that re-
quire accommodation are not caused by the disability itself but by so-
cially installed barriers put in place by the nondisabled majority. Ac-
cording to this argument, accommodations are needed simply to rem-
edy the discrimination inherent in a workplace and society struc-
tured around the able-bodied.205  
 Professor Christine Jolls makes the former argument—that the 
accommodation requirements of statutes such as the ADA and the 
Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA)206 are not much different from 
other antidiscrimination laws, specifically Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act, because both impose costs on employers for the benefit of 
a particular class of employees.207 Her argument that accommoda-
tions are similar to other antidiscrimination measures is based pri-
marily on a comparison to disparate impact law under Title VII.208 
Employers often have to avoid hiring practices that have a disparate 
impact on minority groups even when those practices are economi-
cally efficient for the employer to use.209  
 Scholars also argue that even avoiding simple discrimination (not 
making a distinction based on a protected category, such as race or 
sex) costs employers money if that discrimination could be considered 
“rational” discrimination.210 Because antidiscrimination law prohibits 
rational discrimination—that is, the use of race or sex as an eco-
nomically sensible proxy—Professor Samuel Bagenstos argues that 
“[a]ccommodation mandates . . . do nothing more than present a spe-
cial case of the general problem of rational discrimination.”211  
 As indicated above, the other primary argument made to equate 
accommodation mandates with antidiscrimination mandates is that 
accommodations are needed to remedy the discrimination inherent in 
                                                                                                                     
 204. See infra notes 206-11. 
 205. See infra notes 212-18. 
 206. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 5 U.S.C. §§ 2105, 6381-87 (2000) & 29 
U.S.C. § 2601-54 (2000). 
 207. Jolls, supra note 203, at 649–51. 
 208. Id. at 651. 
 209. See id. at 652.  Disparate impact liability is a theory of liability first recognized by 
the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), and later codified in 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2000). A claim brought under a dispa-
rate impact theory does not allege that the employer had the intent to discriminate against 
the individual or group of individuals; instead, it argues that a neutral employment prac-
tice or selection criteria has a disproportionate, adverse impact on the protected group. 
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431-32. If the employer wishes to continue using such a criteria or fol-
lowing such a practice, it must prove that the practice is both job related and supported by 
business necessity. Id. at 431; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).  
 210. See Mark Kelmun, Market Discrimination and Groups, 53 STAN. L. REV. 833, 850-
52 (2001). 
 211. Bagenstos, supra note 188, at 866. 
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a workplace structured around the able-bodied. For instance, Profes-
sor Mary Crossley argues that “antidiscrimination laws are broadly 
concerned with the removal of barriers that prevent historically dis-
advantaged groups from enjoying equal opportunities to participate 
fully in the richness of American society”212 and that these barriers 
are not related to the disability itself but are caused by the way soci-
ety has structured our world without consideration of the needs of 
the disabled person in mind.213  
 Crossley also argues that because our society has been erecting 
barriers that deprive disabled persons of the full participation in so-
ciety, that process itself is discriminatory.214  
In that light, an order to “stop discriminating” will require em-
ployers and other entities covered by the ADA not only to stop 
building new barriers, but also to dismantle barriers already in 
place. Just as an order to take down a “whites only” sign over a 
drinking fountain is viewed not as a special benefit for black 
people, but as ending discrimination, so should the obligation to 
remove a less overt barrier to a disabled person’s participation 
be viewed.215 
Crossley also suggests that accommodations are only seen as seeking 
preferential or special treatment because the starting point by which 
we compare disabled individuals is the able-bodied population.216 She 
states, 
[O]ur view of accommodations as something special for disabled 
people fails to appreciate that our society constantly accommo-
dates the needs of the non-disabled majority. We just do not recog-
nize those accommodations because of the ableist ethic that suf-
fuses our society. We fail to recognize how much of the existing 
workplace scheme is built around the needs of the non-disabled, 
and we assume that this existing scheme is maximally produc-
tive just the way it is and that, consequently, any accommoda-
tion altering the dominant scheme will increase workplace cost 
and decrease productivity.217 
                                                                                                                     
 212. Crossley, supra note 203, at 863. 
 213. Id. at 863-64.  
 214. Id. at 890. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. at 891. 
 217. Crossley, supra note 203, at 892-93 (footnote omitted). Anecdotally, I have noticed 
this phenomenon most often relating to work schedules and shifts. Employers often have 
set schedules and shifts not because they have determined that they maximize productiv-
ity but because they have always operated in a particular way and are unable or unwilling 
to conceptualize any schedule other than the status quo. Unfortunately, because schedule 
and shift changes are the most frequently requested accommodations, this bias toward the 
structures put in place by the able-bodied majority make it difficult for a disabled employee 
to get the accommodation she needs.  
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Thus, critics of accommodation costs use a status quo that has al-
ready excluded the participation of disabled persons in the workforce 
as a baseline for comparison.218  
 Perhaps the most compelling argument is also the one most easily 
stated: accommodations are different from affirmative action and 
therefore more like antidiscrimination mandates because they do not 
result in an unfair advantage for the disabled person. Rather, they 
simply level the playing field.219 The accommodation is needed simply 
to undo the discrimination inherent in the employer’s failure to 
structure the workplace considering the needs of all employees—
rather than only the able-bodied (often male) employees.220  
2.   Failure to Accommodate Equals Discrimination: This Proposed 
Amendment Remedies the Discrimination 
 If accommodation mandates are the equivalent of antidiscrimina-
tion mandates, then the failure to accommodate is the equivalent of 
discrimination.221 And in fact, that is precisely what the ADA 
states.222 With respect to the reassignment accommodation, which is 
the focus of this Article as well as the Supreme Court decision in 
Barnett, accommodation is necessary to remedy the discrimination 
inherent in the employer’s failure223 to restructure the workplace to 
allow the disabled employee to continue to work in his or her current 
or original position. In other words, reassignment remedies the dis-
crimination without the necessity of proving discrimination in the 
first case. 
 The question then becomes whether reassignment, with its bur-
dens on other employees, is an appropriate remedy. An analogy to Ti-
tle VII jurisprudence suggests the answer is yes. Specifically, I am 
referring to the Supreme Court case of Franks v. Bowman Transpor-
tation Co.224 The issue in that case was whether the Court should 
grant retroactive seniority to victims of discrimination when doing so 
                                                                                                                     
 218. Stein, supra note 203, at 598. 
 219. Ball, supra note 12, at 960. 
 220. See supra notes 165-82 and accompanying text. 
 221. See Crossley, supra note 203, at 890. 
 222. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2002) (defining “discriminate” to include “not making 
reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise 
qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered 
entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the 
operation of the business of such covered entity”). 
 223. This failure is either an inability or unwillingness to restructure the workplace. 
While I recognize that some positions simply cannot be modified to meet the physical re-
strictions of some disabled employees, many (if not most) jobs could be modified if the em-
ployer (and its managers) were able to see “outside the box.” 
 224. 424 U.S. 747 (1976). 
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would arguably affect the seniority rights of other employees who 
were not in the class of persons discriminated against.225  
 In Franks, the plaintiffs were a class of individuals who alleged 
that the employer had engaged in racially discriminatory hiring and 
discharging policies for its over-the-road truck driver positions.226 The 
Court agreed with the plaintiffs.227 When deciding the appropriate 
remedy, the Court first noted that one of the central purposes of Title 
VII is “ ‘to make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of un-
lawful employment discrimination.’ ”228 Without granting retroactive 
seniority, the Court stated it would be impossible to put the victim of 
discrimination where he would have been absent the discrimina-
tion.229 Recognizing the importance of seniority systems, the majority 
held that “class-based seniority relief for identifiable victims of illegal 
hiring discrimination is a form of relief generally appropriate under 
[Title VII].”230  
 The Court then addressed the effect such an award of retroactive 
seniority will have on “innocent” third parties, namely the employees 
already hired. The Court stated, 
[I]t is apparent that denial of seniority relief to identifiable victims 
of racial discrimination on the sole ground that such relief dimin-
ishes the expectations of other, arguably innocent, employees 
would if applied generally frustrate the central “make whole” ob-
jective of Title VII. These conflicting interests of other employees 
will, of course, always be present in instances where some scarce 
employment benefit is distributed among employees on the basis of 
their status in the seniority hierarchy.231 
The Court also pointed out that if relief can be denied simply because 
other employees are unhappy about the relief received by victims of 
discrimination, “ ‘there will be little hope of correcting the wrongs to 
which the Act is directed.’ ”232 
 Justices Burger and Powell, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part, emphasized the inequity of granting competitive-type seniority 
relief at the expense of innocent employees. For instance, Chief Jus-
tice Burger stated, 
                                                                                                                     
 225. Id. at 750. 
 226. Id. at 750-51. 
 227. Id. at 780. 
 228. Id. at 763 (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975)). 
 229. Id. at 764-66 (“Adequate relief may . . . well be denied in the absence of a seniority 
remedy slotting the victim in that position in the seniority system that would have been 
his had he been hired at the time of his application.”). 
 230. Id. at 779. 
 231. Id. at 774. 
 232. Id. at 775 (quoting United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 663 (2d 
Cir. 1971)). 
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[C]ompetitive-type seniority relief at the expense of wholly inno-
cent employees can rarely, if ever, be equitable if that term retains 
traditional meaning. More equitable would be a monetary award to 
the person suffering the discrimination. An award such as “front 
pay” could replace the need for competitive-type seniority relief. 
Such monetary relief would serve the dual purpose of deterring 
wrongdoing by the employer or union or both as well as protecting 
the rights of innocent employees. In every respect an innocent em-
ployee is comparable to a “holder-in-due-course” of negotiable pa-
per or a bona fide purchaser of property without notice of any de-
fect in the seller’s title. In this setting I cannot join in judicial ap-
proval of “robbing Peter to pay Paul.”233 
Despite Chief Justice Burger’s discomfort with what he sees as the 
inequity of retroactive seniority, the Court stated that its hold-
ing—“sharing . . . the burden of . . . past discrimination is pre-
sumptively necessary”—“is . . . consistent with any fair characteri-
zation of equity jurisdiction.”234 Furthermore the Court noted that 
it “has long held that employee expectations arising from a senior-
ity system agreement may be modified by statutes furthering a 
strong public policy interest.”235 
 The lesson from this case is simple: if seniority systems bargained 
for under a collective bargaining agreement can be violated in order 
to remedy discrimination even when there is specific statutory provi-
sion protecting seniority systems under Title VII,236 then certainly a 
seniority system can be violated in order to remedy discrimination 
under the ADA where there is no seniority system exemption.237 If 
one accepts the argument that the failure to accommodate is the 
equivalent of discrimination, then the “remedy” of reassignment, 
even when it violates a seniority system, is an appropriate one.  
                                                                                                                     
 233. Id. at 780-81 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation 
omitted). 
 234. Id. at 777. 
 235. Id. at 778. 
 236. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (2000). This section states, “Notwithstanding any other 
provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an em-
ployer to apply different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system . . . .” Id. 
 237. See Andrikopoulos & Gould, supra note 111, at 372-73. The authors argued that 
the Court’s decision in Barnett was at odds with the Court’s decision in Franks, because in 
Franks the Court had “found that while accommodating the racially discriminated em-
ployee would have some detrimental impact on his coworkers’ interests, ‘employee expecta-
tions arising from a seniority system agreement may be modified by statutes furthering a 
strong public policy interest.’ ” Id. at 372 (quoting Franks, 424 U.S. at 778). The authors 
are correct about the holding of the Franks decision, but they missed an important distinc-
tion. In Franks, there was already a finding that the employer had discriminated against 
minority employees. 424 U.S. at 751. Accordingly, the issue was one of remedy. In order to 
argue that this precedent is binding, we first need to make the argument that the reas-
signment accommodation is needed as a remedy for the discrimination inherent in the em-
ployer’s failure to accommodate the employee in his original position.  
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3.   If Accommodation Equals Affirmative Action, this Proposal 
Represents Lawful Affirmative Action 
 As stated above,238 many scholars have argued that the reasonable 
accommodation provision of the ADA is substantively different from 
traditional antidiscrimination laws and is indeed more akin to af-
firmative action. I have already disagreed with this conclusion above, 
but even if one accepts the argument that reasonable accommoda-
tions amount to affirmative action, the amendment proposed in this 
Article should still be considered valid as lawful affirmative action 
under well-settled (although not uncontroversial) Title VII affirma-
tive action jurisprudence. Specifically, this proposed amendment 
would pass the test announced in the leading Title VII affirmative 
action case, United Steelworkers of America v. Weber.239  
 In Weber, the employer and the union agreed to remedy the sig-
nificant disparity of minority craft workers by implementing a train-
ing program that allowed current production workers to receive 
training which would allow them to move up into one of the craft po-
sitions.240 Selection of those eligible for the training program was 
made on the basis of seniority except that at least fifty percent of the 
new trainees had to be black until the percentage of black skilled 
craft workers in the plant was approximately the same as the per-
centage of black people in the local work force.241 A white employee 
who was passed up for the training program in favor of a black em-
ployee with less seniority challenged the affirmative action plan.242 
The Supreme Court, relying on the legislative history of Title VII, 
held that voluntary affirmative action plans may be valid under Title 
VII as long as they met the following test.243 First, the Court looked 
at “whether the employer has a justification for undertaking an af-
firmative action effort.”244 To make such a finding, the plan must 
have as its purpose the elimination of a manifest racial imbalance.245 
“Second, the Court then consider[ed] the implications or burdens of 
the plan for the rights of those who are not beneficiaries.”246 As the 
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Weber Court stated, the plan must not “unnecessarily trammel the 
interests of the white employees.”247 To make that determination, the 
Court looked at the following factors: (1) “[t]he plan [did] not require 
the discharge of white workers and their replacement with new black 
hirees”; (2) the plan did not “create an absolute bar to the advance-
ment of white employees”; and (3) “the plan [was] a temporary meas-
ure . . . not intended to maintain racial balance, but simply to elimi-
nate a manifest racial imbalance.”248  
 If the amendment proposed in this Article were adopted, accom-
modations given pursuant to it would clearly pass this test. First, it 
is beyond debate that there has always been and there likely will 
always be a manifest imbalance in the number of disabled persons 
in the workforce. Second, an accommodation pursuant to the 
amendment will never unnecessarily trammel the interests of 
nondisabled individuals.  
 The proposed amendment meets the second part of the test be-
cause the proposed amendment does not require the discharge of 
nondisabled employees and the hiring of disabled employees.249 Fur-
thermore, a reassignment accommodation would not keep nondis-
abled employees permanently relegated to inferior jobs. The able-
bodied employee who does not get the transfer (if it is given to a dis-
abled employee as an accommodation) is still employed and will have 
other opportunities to transfer in the future. Unlike a Title VII af-
firmative action plan where there might be many women and/or mi-
norities who could conceivably continue to obtain the desired posi-
tions ahead of white males, in the case of an accommodation under 
the ADA, there simply are not that many disabled individuals. Fur-
thermore, the ADA requires that decisions regarding whether some-
one is disabled and whether an accommodation should be given must 
be made only after an individualized inquiry,250 which is very similar 
to the case-by-case approach used in the Court-approved affirmative 
action plan in Johnson v. Transportation Agency.251  
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 Professor Silvers has drawn a similar comparison between the af-
firmative action test in Weber and reasonable accommodations.252 She 
argues that as long as accommodations of disabled individuals can be 
seen as sharing privilege and recognition rather than shifting it from 
one group to another—that is, from the nondisabled to the disabled—
accommodations should be given.253 In so arguing, she recognizes 
some of the resentment toward affirmative action but argues that 
courts have traditionally “accepted or rejected affirmative action pro-
grams based on differences between sharing privilege, or merely 
shifting it from one group to another.”254 “By unnecessarily pre-
suming that accommodating disabled workers under the ADA 
means shifting privilege rather than sharing it,”255 Silvers argues 
that the Supreme Court has misjudged the nature of the reason-
able accommodation provision.256 
 Comparing disability law to other discrimination law, Silvers ar-
gues that “[c]ourts have long distinguished between remedies that 
result in reverse discrimination because they shift recognition from 
one group to another, and remedies that pass constitutional and 
statutory tests because they share recognition.”257 Reasonable ac-
commodations given under the ADA, according to Silvers, would 
share recognition, not shift recognition, and should therefore be seen 
as similar to lawful affirmative action programs.258 This is so because 
most accommodations given under the ADA do not unnecessarily 
trammel the interests of the nondisabled employees, which is the 
hallmark of a lawful affirmative action program under Title VII.259 
Silvers recognizes that drawing the line between accommodations 
that do and do not unnecessarily trammel the interests of nondis-
abled employees is difficult.260 This proposal will help draw that line. 
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VI.   ADDRESSING THE CRITICISMS 
A.   The Backlash Issue 
 Despite the overwhelming enthusiasm that accompanied the pas-
sage of the ADA,261 there is just as much agreement that the ADA—
at least Title I of the ADA, which governs employment—has not lived 
up to its potential.262 An often-cited study indicates that employers 
have prevailed in ninety-two percent of ADA cases filed in court.263 
After exploring and dismissing other reasons for the lack of success 
in ADA cases—weak claims, poorly drafted statute, confusion over a 
new statute—Professor Diller suggests that the high failure rate of 
ADA cases is caused by a judicial backlash against the ADA.264 He 
states, “The term backlash suggests an hostility to the statute and 
toward those who seek to enforce it. The backlash thesis suggests 
that judges are not simply confused by the ADA; rather, they are re-
sisting it.”265 Diller opines that the backlash may not be an inten-
tional effort to thwart the rights of the disabled.266 Instead, it may be 
the failure to comprehend and accept the underpinnings of the stat-
ute.267 Other scholars have devoted entire books or sections of books 
to discussing the backlash against the ADA, and there appears to be 
very little debate that the backlash does indeed exist.268 
 The backlash is most profoundly seen in the narrow interpretation 
the Supreme Court has given to the definition of “disability.”269 Pro-
fessor Mezey states, “There is a consensus among most disability 
scholars and disability rights advocates that the federal courts, par-
ticularly the Supreme Court, are chiefly responsible for the con-
strained implementation of the ADA . . . .”270 In addition to the nar-
row interpretation the Court has given to the term disability, this 
Article demonstrates that the Court has given a similarly narrow in-
terpretation to the phrase “reasonable accommodation.”  
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 Some have suggested that ignoring the rights of the nondisabled271 
will contribute to the backlash against the ADA. Professor Long 
states,  
Several authors have charged that courts are reluctant to give full 
effect to the ADA because they view the statute as creating “spe-
cial rights” for individuals with disabilities or because they are re-
sistant to the notion that sometimes equality of opportunity may 
require unequal treatment. There can be no question that the ADA 
requires “preferential” treatment in the sense that it may require 
different treatment of disabled and nondisabled employees. How-
ever, it does not necessarily follow that “preferential” treatment of 
individuals with disabilities should amount to detrimental treat-
ment of nondisabled employees. There is perhaps no better way to 
ensure that courts remain reluctant to fully effectuate the ADA’s 
broad remedial goals than to adopt such a reading of the statute.272 
Similarly, Professor Colker has noted that if the failure of the ADA is 
caused by “judicial hostility, rather than poor drafting, then the 
amendment process is unlikely to solve the” ADA’s problems.273  
 I am very cognizant of the potential that any statutory amend-
ment giving additional protection to individuals with disabilities 
would be viewed with hostility. One step this proposal takes to ame-
liorate additional hostility toward disabled individuals is to ensure 
that no nondisabled person would be fired because of the reasonable 
accommodation provision under the ADA. However, I realize that 
this might not be enough and that there is a very real concern that 
the backlash against the ADA would continue unless it is possible for 
additional legislation to influence the public’s opinion and the judici-
ary’s opinion of the ADA. Some have argued that legislation can in-
fluence society’s beliefs. Professor Ball, for example, believes that we 
need to educate the public and judges to destigmatize the idea of 
preferential treatment for the disabled.274 He states, 
The public, as well as judges, need to be educated on the crucial 
role that preferential treatment can play in providing equality of 
opportunity to individuals with disabilities. . . . We need, in other 
words, to shift our understanding of preferential treatment in dis-
ability discrimination law from one that renders such treatment as 
suspect to one that views it as legitimate and necessary. One way 
of doing this is to make a positive case on behalf of preferential 
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treatment by explaining the role that it plays in promoting equal-
ity of opportunity for individuals with disabilities.275 
Others suggest that education is what is missing in the disability 
movement.276 Professor Davis, for example, believes that we will 
never have a reversal of the backlash against the ADA until the ma-
jority of Americans are educated about individuals with disabili-
ties.277 Perhaps an amendment will help serve the purpose of educat-
ing the courts and the public. 
B.   Sharing the Burden of Accommodation: A Communitarian 
Approach 
 Perhaps the most significant argument to be made against this 
Article’s proposal for statutory amendment is that employers should 
have to bear all of the cost of accommodation rather than passing 
some of the cost onto the rest of the workforce. In other words, even if 
we accept that the disabled employee should be accommodated, the 
question remains, Who should pay the costs of accommodation? Be-
cause the employer often creates the workplace and its structures 
with a bias toward the able-bodied, there is a compelling argument to 
be made that the employer should have to bear the cost of remedying 
that discrimination. This argument is similar to the one made in the 
concurrence and dissent in the Franks case discussed earlier, where 
Justice Burger compared the innocent employee whose seniority is 
trumped to a “holder-in-due-course” of negotiable paper in the com-
mercial context.278 Justice Burger made the argument that if the em-
ployer has two competing obligations—to the victim of discrimination 
and to the other employees in the workplace—the employer should 
have to bear the cost of its discrimination.279  
 Justice Burger’s argument is especially compelling in light of the 
fact that the legislative history of the ADA states that after the pas-
sage of the Act, employers and unions should negotiate their collec-
tive bargaining agreements in a way that does not interfere with the 
provisions of the ADA.280 In other words, Congress intended that is-
sues like the one in Barnett would not arise because employers and 
unions would have drafted exceptions to their seniority systems in 
order to comply with the Act. Certainly, if Congress intended that 
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employers and unions negotiate their collective bargaining agree-
ments to make way for the ADA, it follows that Congress also ex-
pected employers with unilateral seniority systems to provide an ex-
ception in their seniority systems to handle the Barnett scenario. For 
all of these reasons, it is indeed a strong argument that employers 
should have the burden of “paying” for their conflicting obligations to 
both the disabled employee under the ADA and the nondisabled em-
ployee under the seniority system. However, in Barnett monetary 
payment would have been insufficient for Barnett because there was 
no other job within the company for which he was qualified.281 Never-
theless, a payment of money might have pacified the individual with 
more seniority who wanted Barnett’s mailroom position. 
 However, a rule that does not allow an employer to shift some of 
the “cost” of accommodation to the rest of the workforce would be 
unworkable, contrary to Congress’s intent, and inefficient. In reality, 
if an employer can give another accommodation that does not ad-
versely affect other employees, it will often choose to do so. It may 
not want to infringe on other employees’ rights, so it bears the bur-
den itself. For instance, one employer with rotating shifts might al-
low itself to be understaffed on one shift and overstaffed on another 
to avoid having to make other employees work the less desirable 
shifts to accommodate the disabled employee who needs a set sched-
ule. But, if the employer did not choose to voluntarily mismanage its 
shifts (or became weary of doing so after having accommodated for 
awhile), this employer might have a decent argument that such a 
sacrifice creates an undue burden for the employer. Accordingly, un-
der the current structure of the ADA, a proposal putting the burden 
of all accommodations on an employer would likely lead to many ac-
commodations not being given because they would result in an undue 
hardship for the employer. One might argue that we should then 
eliminate the undue hardship defense, but that proposal would 
clearly be contrary to Congress’s intent when drafting the ADA.282  
 Moreover, a rule that would put the entire burden of accommoda-
tion on the employer is also inefficient. Using the rotating shifts ex-
ample above, it is more efficient for other employees to rotate 
through the less desirable shift more often than it is for the employer 
to overstaff and understaff its shifts in order to accommodate the 
disabled employee. The same inefficiency can be found with the reas-
signment accommodation. If we required a result where an employer 
could not pass the “burdens” of accommodation onto its other em-
ployees—at least not without compensation—an employer would 
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have to pay extra to the nondisabled employee who does not get the 
transfer when that employee is not performing any additional tasks 
to warrant the extra compensation and that employee is not any 
more valuable.  
 In addition to these pragmatic concerns, another justification for 
passing some of the costs of accommodation on to other employees 
can be drawn from the literature regarding the “communitarian the-
ory.” The communitarian theory is considered one critique of several 
of liberal theory; it bases its view of equality on the idea that our 
shared human traits do more to define us than the things that make 
us different—for example, sex, race, national origin, and so on.283 
Liberal theory considers individuals as self-reliant and autonomous, 
without dependence on other individuals.284 Professor Ball argues 
that the ADA, specifically the reasonable accommodation provision, 
is at odds with the liberal theory of equality because the liberal the-
ory both emphasizes “the role that sameness plays in its vision of 
equality” and because it understands individuals to be “equally self-
reliant and independent beings.”285 He looks to both feminist theory 
and communitarianism as providing alternative theories to support 
the ADA.286 
 Communitarians criticize the liberal view that conceptualizes in-
dividuals as separate and distinct from the communities to which 
they belong.287 Communitarians believe that the communities to 
which we belong—including our family, employer, and neighbor-
hood—help to define who we are and what we believe.288 Professor 
Ball states, “Communitarians argue that individuals have no mean-
ingful identity independent of their ties to others. Instead, ties of 
friendship, obligation, and loyalty provide individuals with their 
sense of identity and bind them to the lives and well-being of oth-
ers.”289 Communitarians also criticize liberal theory’s attempt to put 
individual rights ahead of the public good.290 While communitarians 
believe in individual rights, they believe that those rights too fre-
quently trump the responsibilities that individuals owe to others as 
well as what is in the public’s best interest.291 Accordingly, communi-
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tarians believe that liberal theory causes individuals to alienate each 
other because “[i]f everyone is pursuing his or her own interests or 
claims separately with little regard for the impact on others, there is 
little opportunity or incentive for individuals to come together and 
discuss shared interests and goals.”292 
 When one views reasonable accommodations that affect other em-
ployees, the communitarian theory supports this Article’s attempt to 
spread the burden of accommodation beyond the employer’s pocket-
book to the rest of the workplace, as a community. It is without doubt 
that the ADA not only furthers the disableds’ interests, but it also 
furthers the interests of society as a whole, because by increasing the 
employment opportunities for qualified individuals with disabilities, 
society thereby decreases those individuals’ reliance on public subsi-
dies. Instead of requiring only the employer to bear the cost of ac-
commodation, when it is much more efficient to spread that cost out 
to other employees, a communitarian approach supports sharing the 
cost of accommodation. Consider the above example of an employee 
requiring a set shift, presumably the sought-after day shift, when all 
other employees are required to rotate through the shifts. As noted 
above, if there was a rule that precluded an employer from giving an 
accommodation that affected other employees, the employer would be 
required to understaff its afternoon and night shifts, and overstaff its 
day shift, which is undoubtedly an inefficient result. The communi-
tarian approach would look to the community as a whole and the ties 
that bind that community of “friendship, obligation, and loyalty,”293 
and it would deem it not only fair but necessary to spread the burden 
in a reasonable way to the rest of the workforce by asking that every-
one rotate through the less desirable shift more often in order to pro-
vide the accommodation of the straight shift to the disabled employee 
without unduly tying the hands of the employer.  
 What occurs with reasonable accommodations for disabled indi-
viduals is really no different than the type of community support and 
accommodation that takes place every day in the workplace. Employ-
ees help other employees. If one employee experiences a death in the 
family, other employees would certainly rally around that employee 
to give her the support she needs and cover for her during her ab-
sences. If another employee injures himself skiing, certainly his co-
workers would not balk at having to pick up the slack because he is 
temporarily unable to do so. Employees do these things because they 
care about the community in which they work and they realize that 
the loyalty given to that community also benefits them. While many 
people look at individuals with disabilities as the ultimate “other” 
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and with a strong sense of “that could never be me,” the truth is that 
anyone could become disabled at any time. Keeping valuable disabled 
employees in the workforce does not merely benefit the company as a 
whole; being part of a community that shares each other’s burdens, 
in the long run, benefits everyone.  
VII.   CONCLUSION 
 Congress’s goal in enacting the ADA was to provide equal oppor-
tunity for individuals with disabilities.294 Achieving this goal must 
include an attempt to accommodate disabled employees as often as 
possible in order to allow them to remain productive and valuable 
members of the workforce even when such an accommodation affects 
other employees. Because the comparative consequences to the two 
groups of employees almost always favors accommodation, this Arti-
cle has proposed that Congress amend the reasonable accommoda-
tion provision of the ADA, requiring employers and courts to grant 
accommodations of last resort even if the accommodation does or 
could affect the rights or interests of other employees unless the ac-
commodation would result in another employee’s termination.295 This 
amendment is necessary to remedy the discrimination inherent in 
the inability or unwillingness of employers to rid their workplaces of 
discriminatory barriers and is a reasonable burden to share with the 
rest of the workforce without unnecessarily infringing on their rights. 
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